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
THE RICE INSTITUTE

A university of liberal and technical learning
founded by William Marsh Rice in the City
of Houston, Texas, and dedicated by him to
the advancement of Letters, Science, and Art

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LECTURES ON BRAZILIAN AFFAIRS¹

I

GLIMPSES OF BRAZILIAN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

I HAVE been asked to talk about my country. What a lot I should find if only time were given to me, but happily enough for you, minutes and not hours have been allotted to the task. So I have to try to put in a few words some definite information about a country of eight and a half million square kilometers and forty-five million inhabitants.

Accordingly, I am not going to tell you anything about our tropical climate or our great rivers, the Amazon, the Paran , or the S o Francisco. I am not even going to tell you either about our having been a European colony for three centuries (the fact is pretty common among us Americans), or about our empire that lasted almost seventy years (that has been our originality), or about our fifty-year-old Republic. All these facts of our national background are so well known in the States that mere allusion to them would make this discussion sound like the introduction to a traveler's guide. I shall rather point out to you a few characteristic features of our past and of our present, picked at random for their connection with our geography.

¹Several of a series of lectures delivered at the Rice Institute in March and April, 1940, by Dr. Carlos Delgado de Carvalho, Professor of Sociology in the Colegio Pedro II of Rio de Janeiro and Professor of the Geography of Brazil in the University of Brazil, accredited as Visiting Carnegie Professor to Washington and Lee University, the Rice Institute, and the University of Michigan, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

I. TWO HISTORICAL FACTS

The first historical event I intend to submit for your consideration is that our frontiers were traced before we had been discovered. It is not strictly true to say *we*, because at that time *we* were in Portugal. This requires some explanation. As the discoveries of Columbus were possible causes of conflict between Spain and Portugal, Alexander VI, the Spanish Pope, divided the Western World from that of the East by the so-called Demarcation Line of 1493. The undiscovered part of the world was to be divided between Spain and Portugal with the imaginary line placed about one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.

It is said that the Portuguese already had in their Archives of Overseas secret knowledge of the existence of continents in the Western World. Therefore they insisted on having an alteration of the Papal Bull, so that by direct negotiations of King John II of Portugal at Tordesillas in June 1494, the Demarcation Line was pushed westward by over 370 leagues.

The Spaniards, lured by the isles of Central America, left unknown South America to the Portuguese, who six years later, on their way to India, landed on their allotment here just to set foot on the land secured by their diplomatic victory. There was no other inconvenience in the discovery of Brazil. Yet the Tordesillas Line would not explain the present extent of Brazilian territory if there had been no further "pushing back of the meridian," as we say.

The second historical event I wish to point out is the result, the happy result, of the great unhappiness of Portugal, known as the "Sixty Years' Captivity," during which the Spaniards of the Philippine dynasty ruled the dominions of the Portuguese.

Since Philip II ruled both Spain and Portugal, nobody paid any attention to the westward push of the Luso-Brazilians into the wilderness between 1580 and 1640. In these sixty years the sovereignty of the Portuguese State was lost, but the spirit of nationality did not abate; on the contrary, it seems that it took refuge in Brazil, where a steady stream of Portuguese and even Spanish immigration began to worry the Spanish monarchy. Protected against Spain by being Spanish and against French ambition, Brazilian pioneers, the *bandeirantes*, began to raid the hinterland, taking no notice of the Demarcation Line, that was soon crossed and left behind by these spirited explorers and conquerors. After 1640, it was late for the Spaniards to recover the ground unwittingly lost to the Portuguese. The treaty of Madrid, in 1750, recognized a *de facto* situation on the ground of the *uti possidetis*. The frontiers reached at that time obliterated the Tordesillas Line and outlined our present boundaries.

It is thus easy to understand that the primary geographical influence acting upon Brazilian history is that of geographical remoteness. It is the same principle we find in many colonial stories: the Brazilian settlements were far from Lisbon, as Britain was far from Rome, as New England was far from London, and the same fact acted in the same way. The autonomous institutions of the Portuguese isles of the Atlantic were applied to Brazil; captaincies were formed. A certain particularism was born that explains the federalism as a natural consequence of the traditions of our own past.

The local history of Pernambuco, Minas Geraes, and São Paulo is rich in episodes that illustrate the consequences of geographical remoteness. It took the indomitable strength of the mamelucos of São Paulo to keep together the different parts of the colony.

During long years, the Brazilian historical centers, connected only by the sea, remained in isolation and acquired peculiar characteristics: Pernambuco appears to us as the symbol of republican and radical ideals, relentless throughout our history; Bahia is the watchtower of religious faith and Portuguese traditionalism; São Paulo carries the banner of liberalism in the constitutional monarchy as well as in the civilian republic; Rio Grande, with its frontier spirit, stands for federalism and strong nationalistic ideals. Rio de Janeiro, as a true political center, reflects, by turns, these different projections.

II. GEOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

The study of our history allows geographical interpretations of many of the present social features of Brazil. The coastline, the highlands, the rivers, and the climate have bearings of great interest on the development of the country. It is my purpose to refer briefly to each of these sets of conditions.

1. The continent of Brazil is massive and her shores extend over 36° of latitude. As land and water frontiers are equivalent, we may say that her "maritimity" is 50 per cent, in Ratzel's phrase. The littoral indentations and islands are few, and the articulations are small. The width of the coastal area varies from north to south: wide in the Amazonian latitudes, narrow in the neighborhood of Rio and Santos; alternatively low and sandy, high and rocky. The accessibility of the hinterland varies in the same terms.

It would be misleading to study the influences of such data on human occupation without bearing in mind that these geographical conditions had to act on newcomers belonging to a civilized, seafaring people, with a colonial policy of their own and addicted to the methods of the epoch.

The northern part of the country was occupied in turn by European seafaring peoples, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and even the French. The only ones that tried to develop inland resources were the Portuguese; the others had more commercial purposes and did not overstep the fall-line of the Atlantic rivers. These social elements, however, had to keep contact with the mother country. I suppose a native civilization would have been of less importance to it.

That fact helps us to understand the peripheral colonization which characterizes the first period of Brazilian history. This phase may be called the period of "hem colonization." "Thus, for nearly two centuries," says an early Brazilian historian, Vicente de Salvador, "the colonists went on scratching the coast like crabs." The highway of communications remained for a long time the sea; even today, the usual connection between north and south is still the sea.

As a political consequence of the peripheral or hem colonization we find in Brazil a striking application of the geographical law of "territorial continuity." Therefore, after the colonization of São Vicente and Espírito Santo, the connecting link, Rio de Janeiro, was founded; after Bahia and Pernambuco, Sergipe was needed; in the south, the occupation of Colonia do Sacramento led to the foundation of Laguna and Rio Grande do Sul. The law applies even when one of the terms of the series is foreign, as was the case with the French, where Maranhão led to the colonization of the connecting link, Ceará.

As an economic consequence, the soil and climatic conditions of the coastal fringe compelled the settlers to cultivate tropical colonial products. Sugar cane was the first staple product brought from the Portuguese islands to Pernambuco, São Vicente, and Bahia. Cattle breeding, tobacco, and Brazil wood were complementary industries. This was

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the sugar period of our commercial history, and our output became staple in the international trade of Portugal.

The historical meaning of our coastal topography has had a far-reaching influence on our civilization. Even now, our great centers of expansion and irradiation are on the coast or within a few miles of it. Their history has the deepest roots in our past.

2. The second geographical phase of Brazilian history has distinctive features: the approach to the highlands and the conquest of inland mineral treasures. It leads us to the gold period of our economic history.

It is a common saying among us that "our altitudes redeem our latitudes": the Brazilian highlands of the "Atlantic Massif" grant us temperatures that the latitudes denied. One could as well say that Brazil is a gift of her highlands as Egypt is a gift of the Nile, the British Isles a gift of the Gulf Stream, or Glasgow a gift of the Clyde.

The Brazilian Massif is a geographical complex of a core of ancient rocks, overlaid, in parts, by newer sandstone. In the group of schists, quartz, itabirites, and limestone, it contains rich deposits of gold, iron, manganese, lead, etc. Extensive areas of the interior are still unknown, although the principal rivers, Araguaya, Xingú, Tapajoz, and Madeira have been explored several times.

There is a marked contrast between the northern part of the Brazilian mountain ranges and the southern part. The contrast has bearings in political and in economic national life:

a. The Chapada Diamantina in Bahia and the Borborema in the northeast are much farther from the seashore than the Southern System of the Serra do Mar and Serra Geral; and more ground is thus yielded for cultivable plains in the north, where the fall-line is more inland.

b. The average altitudes of the southern ranges are more pronounced, though three thousand meters is seldom reached. The passes are few, higher, and therefore more important than in the north.

c. The direction of the ranges in Rio, São Paulo, Paraná, and Santa Catharina is almost parallel to the coastline, whereas in the northeast directions are different, but generally coastwise, thus opening highways towards the interior. Instead of being a barrier, as in the south, the more accessible system of the north affords natural roads of penetration.

d. The general aspect of tableland in Parahyba, Pernambuco, and even Ceará has a peculiar flat sandstone shape with bushy vegetation and rainless climate; it contrasts with the crystalline, half-orange, round features of the Rio-Minas-São Paulo relief endowed by heavy summer rainfall with forests and grasslands.

These two environments have acted differently on the colonists; two cycles could perhaps be distinguished for the sake of simplicity: one with Pernambuco as its center, the other with São Paulo as irradiating point.

Hundreds of Tupi tribes were found by the pioneers. In the south they were met on friendly terms; in the north they were driven back by the whites. In São Paulo, the Indians were protected by the strong barrier of mountains, and the Portuguese had to come to terms with them until they were allowed to climb up the highlands, where they were received as guests and could settle at last. The marriage of the adventurer, João Ramalbro, with an Indian chief's daughter was a striking episode of that attitude. In the north, the intention of subduing the natives was evident from the beginning, because it was easier to get at them.

The penetration of the northeast led the colonists to ex-

pand cattle breeding and draw from the accessible "sertão" their own supplies. The south remained rather agricultural and, at the beginning, was held by small landed proprietors; the north saw the first developments of large colonial estates.

The second part of the sixteenth century was devoted to the defense of the new colony. For that reason our coastal towns were located at the entrance of harbors protected by rocks, as fortresses: Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, for instance, where the government was established in turn.

Becoming Spanish, the Portuguese colony got into the Spanish colonial entanglements and suffered from the great struggle for the liberty of the seas, between the Dutch *mare liberum* doctrine and the Spanish *mare clausum* monopoly.

During the Dutch occupation, after 1630, the economic necessity of conquering more inland pastures, of subduing the relentless Cariris Indians, and especially of organizing for defense against the Dutch, who dwelt on the coast, made the hinterland of Pernambuco a center of resistance. It was the most dramatic episode of our history: we had to fight for ourselves, for our faith and our language, for our laws and traditions, for the Latin race; from the Peninsular forces we had scarcely any help. After twenty-five years of struggle, we were able to oust the Dutch from our shores! We had started as a handful of planters and cattle breeders, colonists of a colony of Spain, and we woke up to find we were a country; it was the birth of our Nation, for our victory of 1654 over the Dutch gave us consciousness of our nationality and sealed our political unity. Spanish America had no such powerful external foe to struggle with: perhaps that is why Bolivar's dream of unity never came true.

With the colonization of the São Paulo highlands by the diplomacy of the sugar planters of São Vicente, and the colonization of the Borborema interior by the armed con-

quest of the northern cattle breeders, the historical significance of the coastal mountain ranges seems to fade. But the importance of the Serras is still great and far-reaching in the economic story of the country.

3. In the second part of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth, the part played by a third geographical element, the rivers, is of paramount historical importance. These are the centuries of the Brazilian rivers.

The needs of the cattle breeding industry in the north, the labor question leading to the enslavement of Indians in the south, and, later on, the lure of precious stones and mines, attracted populations to the interior.

Curiously enough, with the exception of the Amazon and the River Plate systems, there are no rivers navigable for any considerable distance from the sea; as a rule, the fall-line is not far inland. The São Francisco, for instance, offers 185 miles from its mouth to the first fall; the Parahyba has about 60 miles navigable in its lower part. If many Brazilian coastal centers are located at the mouth of a river the fact is chiefly due to the opportunity of free access to the sea where a river breaks the land barrier of the shore.

But most of our rivers have a navigable upper stream on the highlands and lead the way inland, as the São Francisco, which has a remarkable stretch of 830 miles on the plateau, and as the Parahyba and also the Tieté, the great river that flows from the neighborhood of the coast towards the Paraná.

The great rivers of the interior played a considerable part in the history of Indian pre-Colombian migrations from north to south and from south to north—the Tupis used freely the Tapajoz and the Xingú.

Penetration of the interior by way of her rivers opens another period of the history of Brazil: the era of the *bandeirantes*.

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The *bandeira* or "banner" was an armed expedition formed of bands of fifty or more men with horses, mules, civilized Indians, monks, and slaves, for the purpose of reaching unknown districts and capturing Indians, for manual labor was already lacking in the Portuguese colony.

The *bandeiras* of São Paulo, the most famous of all, used to follow down the river Tieté to reach Matto Grosso and Goyaz, or to follow the Parahyba down to cross the Montiqueira ranges and reach Minas Geraes. The *bandeiras* of Bahia followed up the São Francisco aiming also at Minas Geraes. But it was not until the last years of the seventeenth century that gold was actually found in the district at Caeté, in Minas Geraes.

The lure of gold and diamonds has been a powerful factor in the economic life of the Portuguese colony as well as in its social development, and thousands of male negroes were bought in Bahia and taken to Minas where they mixed with white adventurers and Indian natives. This explains why the black element of our population is scarce in the inner parts of the country, where it has been ethnically absorbed by the stronger mamelucos element.

An important part in our history is taken by the paulistas, or *bandeirantes* of São Paulo, to whom we owe the extension of our far-western limits. They attacked even the Indians of the Jesuit missions, on the Upper-Paraná and middle Paraguay; they reached Bolivia and Peru in 1649 and 1662. Towards the north, they followed the São Francisco and settled in Piauhý.

A contemporary historian, João Ribeiro, has written that the São Francisco River has been the highway of Brazilian civilization: mining and cattle breeding, the two main peopling factors, were united by its stream, the connecting link of north and south, the "truly Brazilian Brazil," as he says.

Other writers, as Capistrano de Abreu and Euclydes da Cunha, have celebrated the river as the "unifying factor of our ethnological elements."

It would be useless to emphasize the importance of the Amazon and the River Plate systems in the penetration movement. The Paraguay has been for centuries the only natural way to our Matto Grosso, therefore we were very deeply interested in the freedom of its navigation. Our international policy in the River Plate led us to the occupation of Spanish-speaking Uruguay. In the eighteen-sixties, we were unfortunately also involved in the Paraguayan war.

In Amazonia, on the other hand, we find a striking contrast between two facts of anthropo-geography: the Amazonian forest is the greatest obstacle to human penetration, and the Amazonian rivers the greatest help to it, for their network of navigable waters carries ocean-going steamers sixteen hundred miles from the sea. Pará was founded in 1616 as a fortress and so was Manáos in 1660. Colonization on the margins was taken up in the eighteenth century by Jesuits, Carmelites, and Franciscans. In the nineteenth century, the rubber trees attracted emigrants from Ceará, the so-called *paroáras*, fleeing from the periodical droughts of their province.

From the second half of the last century, railway building becomes a substitute for rivers and highways, and the historical rôle of the river system seems to fade accordingly.

4. It may be surprising to note that the fourth geographical element, the climate, has only recently been taken into consideration. The peculiar fact about it is that the first settlements in Brazil were not guided by any climatic conditions. No regard was ever paid to the heat or the drought in the early colonial settlements. The best climatic parts of the country, namely, the southern highlands and plains, were

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then considered second-rate for colonization and the plains of the extreme south were occupied merely for military purposes in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Early colonial Brazil was tropical. Later on, in 1763, the capital was removed from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, and the leading political forces found their field of action in sub-tropical Brazil. With the twentieth century the shift of economic, if not of political, interest is still southwards. Through colonization with European elements, the southern part of the country increases every year in economic importance.

The heat and dampness of the equatorial forest, on the Amazonian rivers, is not unbearable, but does not seem suitable for large-scale plans of European settlement. Colonization by northeastern elements, already acclimatized as we saw in the case of the *paroáras*, is far the best plan. Thus the two equatorial districts, the semi-dry northeast and the super-humid Amazonia, are happily complementary to one another.

In the southern temperate part of Brazil, as well as on the tropical highlands, the chief social facts connected with climate and vegetation belong to our contemporary history and chiefly to our immigration policy.

J. F. Normano has applied to Brazil Professor Turner's expression, "the moving frontier," meaning by it the economic expansion of the country within her political boundaries. It does not mean political expansion—we have no territorial ambitions—but the mere adjustment of existing territories to the economic life of the nation: internal colonization, the pushing of the economic frontier towards the political frontier.

Forward-moving elements of that advance are bound to connect their activities with climatic conditions and hy-

gienic relationships. This leads us to the immigration problems of the country.

III. IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION

About five million immigrants have settled in Brazil since Independence was declared in 1822. Of course every year there is also a variable emigration from the country, but it is comparatively small.

The most important ethnic element in immigration is the Portuguese, yet it has not been predominant in all periods of our colonization. In colonial times, the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish, as I said, had occupied parts of the territory, but they left relatively few biological or cultural vestiges. It was only natural that Portugal should desire to remove from her colony foreign competition that could threaten the conquest of the country. She feared religious dissidence as much as political variance. And she restricted native competitive industries according to prevalent standards of colonial economy.

Foreign influences came to bear only after 1808, when the Portuguese Court arrived in Rio, leaving Portugal to the Napoleonic armies. Brazil became in turn the center of a new kingdom. In November 1809, Don João, the Regent, authorized by royal decree the concession of land tracts or "sesmarias" to foreigners as well as to Portuguese. The previous year he had already opened the ports to international trade.

The first colony formed with alien elements was Nova Friburgo, organized in 1818, in the neighborhood of the capital. A few years later, in 1824, under Emperor Pedro I, São Leopoldo was established in the extreme south, chiefly with German elements. During the eighteen-forties, private initiative was the leading factor in colonization. In São

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Paulo, Senator Vergueiro started the slow process of substituting free labor organization for slave labor, thus paving the way to emancipation without friction, which was declared in 1888, one year before the downfall of the Empire.

The policy of the Emperor, Pedro II, was carried on by the Provisional Government, but the Republican Constitution of 1891 altered the situation, handing over property in land to the newly-formed states; thus colonization became also their business.

Only fifteen years later was a reaction felt in our colonization policy: the Federal Government took back the responsibility and reverted to the traditional policy. It was a new era of organization and outside propaganda that started thus in 1906, under President Affonso Penna and Secretary Miguel Calmon.

A ministry of agriculture was established a little later. "Peopling of the Soil" became the slogan. New immigration laws were passed in 1907 and 1911. New colonial centers or "nuclei" were organized, but, we may say, not until postwar readjustment was the labor problem positively faced by the government. Labor was admitted in batches, almost without discrimination, so eager were we then to get numbers.

During the sixty earlier years of independent life, Brazil admitted half a million foreigners willing to settle on her territory. The twenty years that followed 1884 brought in free labor at an annual rate of ninety thousand immigrants. For the ten years that preceded the Great War, the annual average rose to about one hundred thousand; the ten years that followed 1914 record about half a million more aliens admitted. Since 1924, nearly a million immigrants have been registered at our ports.

Immigration restrictions started in 1930, and the Con-

stitutions of 1934 and 1937 adopted the quota policy followed in the United States ten years before. The purpose was not only to restrict competitive foreign labor and avoid unemployment, but principally to keep pace with a well-timed process of assimilation and national integration.

Brazil has started a new policy with the establishment of a National Council of Immigration. New enactments have been proposed to the government, especially in the year 1938. A rather important step was made in April 1939, in connection with Portuguese immigration. As a desirable ethnical element to mitigate alien inflowing streams, the Portuguese were exempted from the quota restriction. In March 1940, the quota restriction was removed for citizens of the American Republics.

Of the immigrants landing in Brazil under the quota rate of 2 per cent, we note that nearly 35 per cent were Italians, 30 per cent Portuguese, 12 per cent Spaniards, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent Germans; and that nearly 60 per cent of the total number of immigrants settled in São Paulo.

Among the immigration problems facing us lately and freely discussed in our papers, three questions have been conspicuous: the question of Japanese colonization, which, despite tremendous opposition, already incorporates a quarter of a million or so of subjects of the Mikado; the Assyrian colonization question, related to the proposed admittance of Irak laborers and cattle breeders of which the British wished to get rid in their mandated territory; and the question of Jewish refugees from Central Europe, who are being admitted in small groups.

We need labor, we want men to people our western lands. We are not raising a barrier to Humanity's ambitions and happiness, but we can no longer admit foreign elements without discrimination and thus endanger our national life

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by flooding our country. In the present turmoil of ideas, of interest, and rapacity, we are bound to have a colonization policy and to stick to it!

IV. THE GREATEST CIVILIZATION OF THE TROPICS

In civilization Brazil leads the Tropics, and, as far as population is concerned, it is the first Latin country in the world. Our culture is of occidental origin and therefore bears many European features. The ties are still very strong. They differ in their nature according to whether their European source is Portugal, England, France, Italy, or Germany. Cultural traits have been transplanted, and in their new surroundings are developing new ways of thinking through which we feel ourselves more intimately tied to our American neighbors and especially to the United States, which we are learning to know better every year and for whose people we feel an ever-growing sympathy.

Still, material civilization is becoming standardized all over the world, and Brazil has not escaped this world-wide evolution. Therefore, the chief difference between what we find in that country and what exists in temperate and cold zones is restricted to diversity of natural resources in raw materials and foodstuffs. It is often repeated that if Brazilian economic history had to be told in a few words, just three of them would be enough to describe our past: sugar, gold, and coffee.

American sociologists emphasize, as a rule, the importance of what they call "cultural complexes." Sugar, gold, coffee, have been, in turn, cultural patterns, made up of material traits, food habits, social and family systems, property and legal forms. Even the State has been influenced by these patterns.

Before the World War the coffee complex was the central

cultural pattern, we may say, around which Brazilian economic life was organized. Coffee was directly or indirectly the determinant cause of activity, and Brazil was tied commercially, financially, and even socially to the condition of the international coffee market.

In the second decade of the nineteenth century, coffee did not represent more than 20 per cent of our exports; in the middle of the century its percentage was already 48 to 50. At the end of the century, it rose to 60 and over. Curiously enough, after the War, though the coffee complex was positively shattered, the percentage of coffee in Brazilian exports still reached 75 per cent in 1924. Last year, with the new economic trends, it had fallen to 45 per cent.

Many changes were brought about by the War. At the outset, Brazil lost the trade of the Central Powers, which amounted to four million bags; later, the Allies and the United States restricted their imports of coffee. Brazilian rubber exports were also greatly curtailed. Under these conditions, Brazil was led to adopt diversification of crops. The different states, with federal aid, devised various means of propaganda: free instruction, distribution of seeds, transportation facilities. The result was a powerful stimulation to domestic production to supply food for Europe and also to become, on the internal market, producers of rice, corn, beans, meat, cotton, woods, and fruits on a larger scale. Thanks to geographical diversity, a great variety was thus introduced into Brazilian agriculture and, though the international importance of coffee was not impaired, Brazil was no longer "carrying all her eggs in one basket."

Under present conditions, we find a population of about forty-five million, with density of twenty inhabitants per square kilometer in eastern coastal states, supplied by internal markets for all foodstuffs and other essentials.

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The national diet for the lower classes and lower middle classes—black beans, rice, manioc flour, meat, fresh and dried, corn, and fish—is now entirely provided by home production, whereas at the beginning of the century huge quantities of rice were still imported from Burma and beans from Portugal. Of course the diet of the well-to-do is influenced by external conditions; wheat, cereals, wines, and certain fruits are still imported, though Rio Grande do Sul is already increasing her participation in home supply of these staple products.

The second problem in our question of self-support is the supply of raw materials.

Cotton has a rather interesting story in Brazil. As in the case of wheat, plantations were encouraged by circumstances arising from the American Civil War. It can be grown almost anywhere in this country. The progressive industrialization of the country and the demand in foreign markets were alluring conditions for cotton growing. Since the World War, production has increased from below 100,000 tons to 456,000 tons—the amount recorded in 1937. The annual output is divided between the foreign buyer and the home spinner, who needs an ever-larger share for his three million spindles. Most of the cotton mills are in São Paulo, Rio, and the Federal District. The woollen goods industry is developed in Rio Grande do Sul. Jute, silk, and fibers, chiefly imported yarn, are also worked in our industry.

Rubber is, in the economic history of Brazil, the glorious and brief episode of Amazonian prosperity. It attracted immigrants, as we saw, and determined in the nineteenth century a rush towards the north, such as the gold rush of the eighteenth century that penetrated Minas.

Timber, one of the country's greatest riches, is trebling its exports almost every ten years, after supplying the home market.

Cement has as yet a very short history in Brazil, but important and promising. Ten years ago we were importing over half a million tons of cement, almost the total home demand. Today the home production has risen to half a million tons and imports have considerably declined.

Iron, coal, and petroleum are capital problems of our near future. The iron-ore deposits of Minas Geraes are supposed to be the greatest undeveloped reserves of the world.

The list of exports of the country includes many more products: on the one hand, cocoa, maté (the South American tea), sugar, fruits (oranges and bananas) and, on the other hand, such products as manganese, hides and skins, wax, and tobacco.

It would certainly be interesting to recall the history of each of the foregoing resources of Brazil, but we must conclude this discussion with some general account of our present economic situation.

V. THE NEW NATIONAL ECONOMY AND CONSTITUTION

There were, and still are, obstacles and hindrances to free and easy interchange of commodities in Brazil, nor has the task of overcoming such difficulties been a simple one. First of all, imperfect contacts by rail and road cause a certain isolation of the north from the south. In many promising zones, penetration is still difficult because of inadequate transportation facilities. Moreover, the lack of capital and of credit institutions hampers agricultural development to a great extent. There is a deficiency in heavy modern farming machinery. Some parts of the country face the further drawback of labor shortage. For all these reasons many of our natural resources are still unexploited.

There are, however, some striking advantages in our present economic position. In a large country of over three mil-

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lion square miles, there is a remarkable national unity disclosed by singleness of language, of religion, of traditions, of social structure, and consciousness of kind, if I may say so, for we feel strongly our insulation as the only Portuguese-speaking nation in the southern hemisphere.

Such national unity has worked for the perfect integration of Brazilian economy: regional diversity has merely revealed complementary resources, necessity of cooperation in social, political, and economic fields as well, with links forged by common interests. And the present phase of our history, which the friendly foreigner sometimes fails to understand adequately, might be described as the slow, but purposeful and sure, realization of such an ideal.

By keeping this in mind we may grasp the meaning of our new national economy as established by the Constitution of 1937 in which the "economy of production is organized in corporations as representative entities of national labor under the assistance and protection of the State" (Art. 140).

The new economic order is emphasized in the framing of the Constitution by the establishment of a Council of National Economy in close cooperation with the House of Representatives and the Federal Council. A very important part in economic initiative, guidance, and control will probably be taken by this powerful organization.

It would not be fair to gauge our present vitality in terms of export values, because we should consider our inland interchange, our coastwise trade figures, our raw materials and foodstuffs production, and our industrialization that is growing fast.

In conclusion, may I be allowed to quote some lines of a recent British Commercial Report:

Judged solely from the standpoint of foreign trade per capita of population, the criterion which overseas observers are naturally prone to

adopt, Brazil appears as a backward country; during the past few years the rapid diminution in the value of imports and exports alike has caused this impression to be widely held. In order, therefore, to depict the economic situation of the country in its true perspective it seems advisable to refer to the Republic's industrial development, which has reached a point in production and variety well in advance of other South American countries.

It must be remembered that by far the largest part of agricultural and industrial production is consumed by the country's forty-seven million inhabitants, a population greater than that of the rest of South America put together and hardly less than that of the United Kingdom. Viewed from this aspect the small exportable surplus is readily understandable and the impression of arrested development disappears.

By showing in his report of 1936 that Brazil is a self-supporting country in her industrialization phase, exporting merely her surplus production, His Majesty's Vice-Consul in Rio, Mr. N. A. P. Sands, seems to have put his finger, if I may say so, on what the poet called the "very pulse of the machine!"

II

RACE AS A SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTION IN BRAZIL

I. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION

AT first sight, it seems that race could be considered as the capital element of the biological aspect of society. Race is a very common and vague term, freely used in human affairs, but with no precise meaning at all. It stands probably for zoological comparisons, but its chief virtue is to be a powerful appeal to feelings and passion; its value, therefore, is pseudo-scientific.

The only proof that race exists is that we find, nearly everywhere, racial problems, race questions, racial minorities, and so on. It is especially the revision of the European political map in the nineteenth century on the lines of nationality politics and in the twentieth century by the ethnic realities of the Treaties of 1919-1920, that has impressed on our minds the concept of race.

Some people are satisfied with races as major divisions of mankind: black, yellow, brown, white. Others have in view a nation or a country. Some mystics believe in a hypothetical "pure race," that has existed according to a subjective ideal of which they are possibly the prototype. An isolated group with uniform and stable physical aspects is sometimes called a "race." It happens also that race is mistaken for language; for instance, we hear that South America has populations of the Latin race.¹

¹For the lack of clarity in the use of the term "race" see Franz Boas; *Anthropology and Modern Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, new rev. ed., 1932).

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"A race," according to Krober,¹ "is a subdivision of a species and corresponds to a breed in domestic animals. Popularly, the word is used in a different sense, namely, that of a population having any traits in common, be they hereditary or non-hereditary, biological or social."

When the term race is omitted, the term blood is used, though still more confusing, for there is no continuum of actual blood between parent and offspring. The relationship that the word stands for is a biological error, though it be, as Huxley and Haddon said, "a venerable misconception." Another biological fallacy is stock as the true national type readily distinguishable from any other alien blood. All these and still other terms are devoid of standards of reference and are purely impressionistic.

I am quoting frequently from the remarkable little book of 1935, written by Haddon, Huxley, and Carr-Saunders, called *We Europeans*. "In considering the characters of different nationalities," they say, "it will generally be found that the distinctive qualities upon which stress is laid are cultural rather than physical, and when physical they are often influenced by climatic and cultural conditions." Of course, expression, gesture, speech, as well as dress and behavior, are results of cultural factors: imitation, education, fashion. I feel, therefore, justified in considering race essentially as a sociological question. "Race is a unity," says Gumplovicz,² "created in the course of history by social development and is precisely a unity which finds its point of departure in intellectual factors, such as language, religion, morals, law, culture; and thereafter attains the more powerful physical factor, the unity of blood, which binds all together in a true bond."

¹A. L. Krober: *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), p. 56.

²Gumplovicz: *Der Rassenkampf*, French edition, p. 192.

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In fact, what is popularly meant by races is what could be named hypothetical primary sub-species, or simply ethnic groups, or racial types. If we consider animal evolution, the zoological comparison is misleading, for in the animal case, genetics shows that after a certain degree of differentiation the animal becomes incapable of fertile crossing, whereas the man still goes on producing new types of a great diversity and not only an average between the two original ingredients.¹ That constant branching of human evolution is one of the reasons for the difficulty of classification.

Besides, the differences in social environment override the differences in genetic equipment, as Huxley and Haddon observe. "The nation," they say, "is not anything permanent or inherent in human nature. The idea of blood tie has been used to strengthen national sentiment." It is interesting under such light to examine how little of the biological is in the well-known race prejudice, and how important though not readily admitted is the cultural factor. "The biological reasoning," say the authors I am quoting, "is a cloak to fling over obscure, perhaps unconscious feelings." Of course, as in everything human, we need rationalization, and thus we are led to dislocate the real antagonism. So do the Germans when they persecute the Jew on false grounds of mysticism; the Russians are more frank when expelling the kulaks, just because they obstruct the communist economic plan.

As to ourselves in America, we are not afraid of disharmonic results of the crosses with immigrants; yet the quotas and other restrictions are protections as soon as we feel that by immigrant mass invasion our social systems might be unable to stand the strain. "There is a limit to the amount

¹*We Europeans*, by J. S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon; with a chapter on Europe Overseas, by A. M. Carr-Saunders (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935).

of foreign stock which can be taken up by a nation in a given time," say the authors of *We Europeans*.¹

So race mixture seems to be, after all, just a question of culture, of nationality, of class or economic status. Most of the so-called race problems are, sociologically, questions of culture contacts. Racialism has therefore great dangers to face, for as an ideal it "contains unrealities and impossibilities which may destroy essential realities and thwart true possibilities."²

The present population of Brazil consists of three elements of different ethnic origins: the White, the Negro, and the Indian; they are four elements if we make a distinction between the Colonial Portuguese of the past and the present European immigrant. But, as far as racial characteristics are concerned, it is a very simplified classification of human elements.

In fact, the Portuguese factor which has been evidently predominant, is responsible for the Latin culture by which we share European civilization. But what was, after all, the Portuguese colonizer of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Surely not a "pure race." He was the biological product of at least ten primitive sub-species, namely, the Iberians and the Phoenicians, Greeks and Carthaginians in a later period; then the Romans, and we know how scarce was the Latin element in their legions; the Barbarian invaders: Suevi, Vandals, Huns, and Visigoths; finally the Mohammedan Moors, African Arab conquerors, from the south. For race mixture the Iberian peninsula had certainly been a privileged ground.

It is essential to note that in such a composite ethnic type the Portuguese colonizer had, besides the melting-pot condi-

¹*Ibid.*, p. 282.

²*Ibid.*, p. 287.

tions of western Iberia, a different historical formation from that of the Spanish-speaking occupants of the Peninsula. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Portugal was already a nationality, strong and unified, that had grown in a lonely corner of the Iberian world, facing the sea to the west, the infidel Moors in the south, and, eastwards, having to fight against all the Spains, Castile, León, and to a certain extent, Navarra and Aragon. In contrast with a Spain divided and merely federated, Portugal, united by language, temperament, political necessity, and seafaring vocation, achieved its European mission one century before Spain—Aljubarrota, 1385; Granada, 1492. That political precocity determined Portugal's mission in Asia, Africa, and America, and it explains the deep differences between the Portuguese and the Spaniard.

Whereas the Castilian is brave, knightly, gallant, and courteous, disinterested in money, boastful, excitable, and emotional, the Lusitanian is stubborn, thrifty, law-abiding, perhaps melancholic and submissive, but with a decidedly marked self-control. He was to be, by geographical and historical destiny, the explorer of the ocean, the lawyer of traditional monarchy, the commercial agent for Overseas.

It was this human element that had to face the native in South America. On Brazilian lands, the Indian was the second element of our race mixture. He was not so well organized, politically, as his western neighbors in the Andean Empires, but he had a culture of his own, his experience of the country, his languages, and practical knowledge of many things. It is said that three thousand words of our language are from Indian origin; they comprehend topographical features, animals, plants, certain products, and even symbols. The influence of the Tupian "lingua geral" is traceable not only in our vocabulary but also in our syntax and prosody.

We have eliminated the mute "e" of the Portuguese, and the tendency is to support every consonant with a vowel and to suppress complicated articulation and finals.

The Indian had a decisive influence on the diet of the newcomers: the mandioca has become the national dish in Brazil. He taught them how to cultivate some of the agricultural products, how to fish and to hunt some of the native animals.

It is difficult to estimate how numerous the natives were, but forming diverse nations, they could raise armies of ten, fifteen, and even twenty thousand warriors; they lived in villages or tabas of one hundred to three hundred groups in a single region. That they were reputed by European historians to be lazy and ungovernable may be easily explained by their communistic life and their views of moral and social values.

"Brazil of the First Century is euro-indigenous: in the home as on the field, in peace as in war, in town as in the country. Scarce and isolated, the Portuguese were mastered by the native customs, at meals, at work, at war, at rest. It all came to him in his immigrant bachelor cabin with the cabocla woman. Little by little an intermediate civilization was created, temporary but original, compounded of European survivals and Tupi tribal influences—it was the culture of the mamelucos of the paulista highland and of the conqueror-breeders that penetrated the North East."¹

The third element of the ethnic mixture was the negro, brought from Africa from 1550 to 1850, that is to say, for precisely three centuries, though not always with the same intensity. Our foremost economic historian, Roberto Simonsen, estimates that three and a half million Africans were landed in Brazil. They came from diverse negro nations of the Black Continent, where the Portuguese got them very

¹Pedro Calmon: *Historia do Brasil*, p. 331.

easily, as they were amazingly prone to sell one another—not only enemies captured in war, but also friends and relatives.

Groups may be distinguished by their African origins: the Bantus, including Angolas, Congos, and Benguellas, who settled predominantly in the North of Brazil—Pernambuco and Maranhão—and, later on, in the South, Rio and São Paulo, where the highland climate did not prove favorable to them. The two other groups, the Guineas and the Sudanese, settled especially in Bahia, the capital of the Colony and principal slave market. Not less than six languages were represented by these African immigrants.

In the seventeenth century the influence of the negro factor begins to outweigh that of the native. First of all, the vocabulary has been deeply influenced by African words referring to everyday life. A student of mine, Carlos Cantão, has constructed regional maps of Brazil showing all the topographic local names of African extraction. In addition to bringing to light these interesting linguistic facts, they show the range of penetration of the negro element to the extent of covering not less than one-third of the country.

“Thus,” says Pedro Calmon, “another planless type of civilization is sketched at random, with the heavy importation of negroes. That type has just one common feature with the previous luso-native type: the manorial (senhorial) form of latifundium exploitation. Therefrom results social classification, the monopoly of handwork by the slave, the assumption of nobility by the white man, just for being white, and the division of the inhabitants in castes, the *fidalgos* and the negroes.”

Fifty years ago, the intellectual elite of the country seemed for the first time to be interested in the ethnological questions of race differences. Biologists and medical men, anthropolo-

gists, and even literary critics like Sylvio Romero and José Verissimo joined in the discussion. The most prominent of these scholars was Nina Rodrigues, who accumulated a great amount of information and precious data on negro culture. His works, written in 1900, were published thirty years later, after his death. Dr. Baptista de Lacerda, formerly Director of the National Museum of Rio, attended the First Universal Race Congress, held in London in July 1911, and became well known for his paper on the "Half-Breeds" of Brazil. Dr. Rodrigues Peixoto studied the anthropology of our Indians. Dr. Moura Brasil specialized in indigenous diseases of the sight.

With the revival of sociological studies in Brazil, a new school of anthropologists, under the leading influence of Arthur Ramos, has started lately an encyclopaedia of publications on the negro. The first Afro-Brazilian Congress was promoted by Gilberto Freyre and held in Recife, in 1934; two years later a second congress of the same kind was held in Bahia.

Roquette-Pinto, Heloisa Torres, and Estevão Pinto have studied in many publications the past and present of the Brazilian Indian. And so had Theodoro Sampaio and von Ihering, both dead unfortunately. Today our prominent sociologist, Oliveira Vianna, is trying to draw from these accumulated riches a practical conclusion and a general view of our melting-pot conditions.

The so-called race question has not yet been studied in Brazil with the thoroughness and scientific accuracy it has received in the United States, but there is no doubt that recent and very rapid progress has been made in our research work on the subject. The new interest in native, negro, or immigrant stocks is not restricted to scientific treatment, for it is easy to trace its very remarkable influence on pure litera-

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ture. Since 1920, many novels have been written on regional social environments: Afranio Peixoto, Monteiro Lobato, Paulo Setubal, José Lins do Rego, José Americo, and dozens of others are also popular with Brazilian readers.

II. INDIGENOUS CULTURES IN SOUTH AMERICA

At the University of Virginia a suggestive lecture was delivered some ten years ago by Professor Rudiger Bilden,¹ then research worker on Latin American Affairs. He rightly criticized the view commonly held that the twenty republics of Latin America are fundamentally alike in traditions, psychology, and character and that there is very slight difference between a Peruvian and an Argentine. "Attention," he said, "centers on common denominators of the Latin American countries rather than on vital differences between them. Judgment is based on Latin origin and background . . ."

By stressing factors of European origin, we obscure the diversified, though submerged, forms that are still vital and that explain the individuality of the different countries. As we have seen for Brazil, non-European elements of varied cultural characteristics have entered in considerable proportions. Whatever might have been the superiority of the primitive cultures in contact, none has kept intact its social features. South America has hybrid cultures still in evolution varying according to distinct geographical and historical circumstances. "The extreme may be said to occur," says Bilden, "when a conquered majority surges gradually to the surface and subtly permeates and transmutes the superimposed culture of the minority with its own color and motives, a process which necessarily requires centuries, but is inevitable."

¹"Race Relations in Latin America with Special Reference to the Development of Indigenous Culture," address by Rudiger Bilden at Round Table on Latin American Relations, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, July 1, 1931.

Three factors are to be taken into consideration in Latin America, as the white man's part: Peninsular colonization, European immigration, and the standardizing influence of modern civilization. These factors have been established or modified by local forces and environment, therefore uniformity is more apparent than real. Professor Bilden distinguished four groups of indigenous culture:

1. First, the La Plata Republics (Argentina and Uruguay), and Chile. The elements of opposition and differentiation were from the beginning weaker and less vital. Indigenous tribes were numerically and culturally insignificant; no negro element was introduced in great numbers. On the other hand, climate was most favorable to European settlers.

As a result of these conditions, treatment of the Indians was almost identical with the North American way of dealing with them: segregation and elimination, with perhaps more absorption by the Spaniards than by the English. In consequence, in the La Plata countries, conformity to European standards has been most pronounced and with the accelerated flow of immigrants the evolutionary change has been intensified. "Yet," says Bilden, "they are not and will not be as one-sidedly Spanish as North America is English. Most likely, the secondary European element, the Italian, will make far greater cultural contributions than the corresponding element in the United States, the Teutonic, was permitted to make." In Brazil, by the way, a similar circumstance should be mentioned, namely, the contribution of the Italian element in the southern part of the country, chiefly in São Paulo.

The La Plata group claims therefore to be the Latin counterpart of Anglo-Saxon America. With a similar economic background, a parallel political experience, and like population problems, it is easy to understand why the Argentine is

more inclined to follow European trends and to oppose almost systematically American suggestions that might interfere with her European mission in America, as Latin leader of the New World.

2. The second group is formed by the ethnic complexes of the Cordilleran States of the West, including Mexico, in North America, where racial antagonism prevails rather than intermixture. It results from restricting exploitation of mineral wealth, from speculation, and from conflict with rather highly developed native civilizations. No systematic agriculture was the base of Spanish and Indian cooperation; subjection was aimed at rather than elimination or absorption. In fact, the Spaniards created a social superstructure beneath which alien currents still flow today.

"Because of the essential stratification of society along racial lines and cultural juxtaposition and friction, the atmosphere in all the countries in question is actually or potentially explosive." It seems, in conclusion, that the values of European origin have been subject to transmutation under the influence of a more energetic native culture.

3. A third group includes Paraguay, where conditions similar to those of Haiti and the Dominican Republic are found by the author I have been quoting. The European element is just a veneer; the native substance is a rather incongruous culture mixture. Native conditions and standards are prevalent. Professor Clarence Jones of Clark University says that approximately 92 per cent of the total population consists of *mestiço* and Indian. "Guarani," said Trade Commissioner Schurz in 1920, "remains the common language of the people. The more progressive part of the population is trying to discourage its use, and it is prohibited in the schools, but in spite of prohibition it persists as the language of ordinary intercourse."

4. Very different from the preceding groups is the fourth one that, in contrast, could be called Portuguese America. As such, it cannot be considered merely as one of the twenty republics, but has to be compared as a whole to Spanish America and to English America. One-half of the population of the South American Continent belongs to Portuguese America, and nearly one-half of its territory.

On such a large extent of land, from equatorial to tropical and temperate zones, it is no wonder that a great diversity of environment made the cultural forces more diversified than anywhere else in the New World. "Moreover," says Bilden, "the European element never occupied an actual and undisputed position of dominance. However rigid its economic and political control over the other ethnic elements may have been, socially and culturally it was forced by the geographic milieu and the exigencies of its colonizing policy to compete on an approximately equal basis. The result of an unusually favorable balance and wholesome interaction of forces can be summarized as the intermixture of three radically different ethnic types, White, Indian, and Negro, and the creation of all the necessary conditions for the evolution of a hybrid, composite culture indigenous and unique to Brazil. In so far as the latter has crystallized already it is of a richly varied, yet essentially consistent pattern. The original elements in the compound mixture are frequently not distinguishable any more, except by the trained eye. Yet it should be emphasized that the process of evolution is by no means complete."

Bilden insists on the regional diversification and points to the "harmonious meeting of diversified forces." He is quite right, to my mind, for our different regions are to such an extent complementary in cultural features and achievement that an almost perfect integration seems to result from it.

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When our cohesion, as a nationality, appears loose to the foreign observer, it is because of its great elasticity: many highly trained students of Brazilian social or political conditions have been misled by these appearances.

Tropical plantation agriculture on large estates, with patriarchal traditions of feudal aspect and severe limitation of manpower, worked socially both for enslavement and for intermixture as the inevitable economic policy of Portuguese America. Hybrid society, from the start, it tends to become still more so with time and progress. It is said that the Portuguese has always had a proclivity to miscegenation; the mixture with African elements was started in Portugal, well before the discovery of Brazil. It led to the equalization of races, to the absence of racial antagonism, to the suppression of slavery, gradually and peacefully.

"It has made possible," concludes Bilden, "the peaceful development of a rich and distinctive country, the only country of European origin, in fact, where three fundamental ethnic divisions of mankind mingle on anything like equal terms and participate in the making of an individualistic indigenous culture."

Instead of the urban population that includes about twenty towns of one hundred thousand inhabitants and over, and represents about one-tenth of it, say, between four and five million, let us consider the rural population of nearly forty million inhabitants of the interior zones of the country. Under the ethnic point of view, the towns are cosmopolite centers of great interest, but do not reflect so purely the different types of Brazilian society.

No rigid frames for a classification of our ethnic and economic types of population have yet been devised, but several authors have attempted some logical interpretations. J. F.

Normano, in his book of 1935 on Brazil,¹ has studied the leading economic types: the *bandeirante*, the *sertanejo*, the *fazendeiro*, the *paulista*, and the foreigner. They are a few well-chosen types, in which the economic features, of course, are more emphasized than the ethnical traits. It is curious how foreigners, though they do not always understand us, may sometimes see us better than we see ourselves. That is true of Normano. His book has been translated into Portuguese. I quote from the original American edition.

The penetration into and exodus from the *sertão* has created a series of picturesque economic types, and has given birth to future economic leaders of the country.

The history of those types is a process of concretion. The *bandeirante* is a nomad, his world has no geographical limits, he crosses rivers, deserts, and mountains, he is not handicapped by political borders, he bears his whole world with himself—*omnia mea mecum porto*. . . .

The *fazendeiro* is no longer a nomad, he is tied up with his *fazenda*. We cannot apply to his estate modern European or North American terms: his *fazenda* recalls, rather, a feudal principality. His world is the *fazenda*; he is conservative and stable; he is a reaction against the nomadic character of his ancestor. . . .

The *paulista's* world is the city; he is a cog of the urban mechanism; he has no personal ties with his milieu, but impersonally he is tied up with the country's economy; he is touched by the undulations of the world's economic being. He is mobile, but he is not nomadic. . . .

These three types appear in Brazilian economic history in a genealogical relationship. The *fazendeiro* is the *bandeirante's* son, and the *paulista*—his grandson. The *fazendeiro* often has a *bandeirante* as the founder of the family and is proud of it; the modern *paulista* often belongs to the family of a *fazendeiro*. . . . it is a typological genealogy, and not an historical chronology. . . .

And parallel to this evolution of types, the *sertanejo* remains unchanged, passive and conservative, slightly influenced by the time.

Only one of the human elements of Brazilian economy does not have roots in the national history, in the Brazilian soil. This is the *foreigner*, the recent European immigrant.

He often acclimates himself to the extent of becoming a *fazendeiro*, or

¹J. F. Normano: *Brazil: A Study of Economic Types* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935).

paulista de facto, or a small farmer, shop-owner, entrepreneur or laborer. His rootlessness brings ferment in the development of the country.¹

The sertanejo type, that is to say, the dweller of the sertão, or interior rural zones, is the social result of at least three powerful factors of differentiation: the physical environment, the economic system under which he works, and the historical circumstances that condition the political sphere in which he lives.

"In fact," said Oliveira Vianna, one of our contemporary sociologists, "there are no fixed social environments. It is in that sense that regional differentiations ought to be considered."

An acceptable division, though far from complete, would be to distinguish, first the Northern Populations (Amazonia and Northeast), the Central Populations (Minas, Rio, and Bahia), the Southern Populations (São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul). The classification by states is, of course, very artificial, but there is still something historical and traditional in it that helps in many details.

1. The Brazilian northerner is the caboclo, the crossbreed of Portuguese and Indian without negro blood. He is the result of laws enacted under King Joseph granting privileges to white and native mixture. "The marriage with an Indian girl," says Bertino Miranda, "spelled always preference for public function and nobility."

Amazonia is peopled with two caboclo elements, the native and the adventitious. This latter element is the paroára immigrant who settled on the Amazon River system, flying from his native home, the Northeast and especially the State of Ceará, driven by aridity and drought. Both of these elements explored the equatorial forests and gathered India rubber.

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

The Northeastern caboclo is the cowboy, the cattle breeder of a shrub region, called catinga, in the semi-arid zone. It is the part of Brazil that received the first colonial settlers on its tropical coast. Life in the interior is hard; though more healthy than the equatorial forest, its climate is trying, food is scarce, and the natural obstacles to culture are still great.

2. In the East-Central part of Brazil, Bahia is, under several aspects, a zone of transition. The São Francisco part still belongs to the Northeastern topography and climatic province. The sertanejo type is the jagunco, small farmer or cattle breeder, sometimes an outlaw like Antonio Conselheiro whose resistance to military expeditions in Canudos is described by Cunningham Graham in *A Brazilian Mystic*.

Towards the south of that part of the country, opens the mountain district of Bahia, Minas, and Rio de Janeiro. A different climate, different resources, the proximity of the political centers, and administrative action have moulded a different type. Economic, social, and political importance have shifted to these populations of the central section. The matuto, that is, the backwoodsman, is the typical mixture of three elements, white, negro, and Amerindian. The influx of immigrant blood is scarcely noticeable; it is rather an infiltration.

3. The southern populations of Brazil, in São Paulo, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and South of Matto Grosso are already a different ethnic complex. The temperate climate of the highland—where forest alternates with prairie—mineral resources, and navigable rivers have prepared a Land of Promise for humanity willing to work in peace and freedom.

European history in Southern Brazil is a little shorter than in Northern Brazil; but, within the last century, five million

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immigrants have entered the melting-pot of its million square kilometers without submerging the American element and without holding in check the Portuguese cultural pre-eminence.

In Southern Brazil, two interesting types may be studied as representatives of a race in evolution, the paulista and the gaucho. The South is a laboratory of civilization towards which economic and social leadership is now shifting. Under the pressure of industrialism and scientific farming, a population larger than the Argentine nation is evolving a new type of white man.

III. THE WHITE MAN SOUTH OF THE TROPICS

São Paulo is a state of about $7\frac{1}{2}$ million inhabitants. This federal unit has received, within the last century, $2\frac{1}{2}$ million immigrants of which the Italian contribution is nearly 40 per cent, the Spanish 16 per cent, and the Portuguese 15 per cent. Germans and Austrians, lately Japanese, have entered the state; the Brazilian contribution, from other states, is about 10 per cent, with a substantial increase in recent years.

The average density of population in the state is 30 inhabitants per square kilometer, almost the density of Michigan, which is 33, and just above that of West Virginia, namely, 28. A relatively high percentage of immigrant population is found in towns; thus Italians constitute over 10 per cent of the inhabitants of the State Capital, but only 6 per cent of the inland districts. A still greater disproportion is shown by the Portuguese element, which is 5.6 per cent of the Capital and 1.9 per cent of the rural districts.

The numerical importance of São Paulo in the Federation is rapidly growing; in the seventies it was well under 10 per cent of the total Brazilian population, in 1900 it was 15 per cent, while today it is about 17 per cent.

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As far as assimilation is concerned, the marriage statistics are of significance. We find a contrast between the data of 1895 and those of 1927 in the paulista towns, as exhibited in the following table:¹

<i>Marriages</i>	<i>1895</i>	<i>1927</i>
Paulistas with Paulistas	27.9%	58.6%
Paulistas with Foreigners	9.2%	21.9%
Foreigners with Foreigners	62.9%	19.5%

Today 56 per cent of children attending school were born of paulista parents.

As to the color composition of the population in São Paulo, the Army Medical Service (Lobo da Silva) Statistics show a proportion of 82 per cent of whites, 6 per cent of negroes, and 12 per cent of mestiços.

The distribution of the diverse elements of population—native paulistas, negroes, mulattoes, Brazilian immigrants, and foreign immigrants—varies over the territory of 250,000 square kilometers according to the type of economic exploitation. It would be interesting to follow Alfredo Ellis Junior in his studies of the paulista populations, and explain the diversity of land-distribution in coffee plantations, in cattle breeding, in commercial and industrial centers, and in the thinly populated coastal zone.

Professor Preston James in several geographical papers has reported his personal observations on the economic development of São Paulo, and lately on the “changing patterns of population” in that same Brazilian unit. He thinks that the attachment to the land is still unsatisfactory, and that there is still the problem of the “hollow frontier,” aside from “relict landscapes, shorn of forest cover, with worn-out and eroded soil.”

¹Alfredo Ellis, Jr.: *Populações Paulistas*.

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But let us go back to melting-pot conditions in São Paulo. Besides the historical conditions of colonization in the past and the actual circumstances of immigration, besides the climatic factors and the present economy of the state, a great deal of explanatory material comes to us from demographic statistics, showing how the white man is rapidly gaining ground.

Comparing death-rate and birth-rate of whites, mulattoes, and negroes in the following districts we find (in 100 births and 100 deaths):

		<i>White</i>	<i>Negro</i>	<i>Mulatto</i>
Capital:	Births	94.2	2.1	3.2
	Deaths	86.5	6.4	6.5
Santos:	Births	96.8	0.3	0.9
	Deaths	83.5	5.3	9.2
Guaratinguetá:	Births	83.5	5.5	10.9
	Deaths	74.0	11.4	14.4

Alfredo Ellis, who gives these statistics, concludes, "It is in the Capital and in Santos chiefly that the blacks are undergoing a more rapid process of extinction. The struggle for life overpowers them as it becomes harder and more competitive. They are mostly hired workers in fazendas, earning a daily wage. They work alone, leaving their wives at home or rambling about. Not so the foreigners . . ."

2. The Case of Rio Grande. The southern states of Brazil: Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul have about five million inhabitants; the influx of European blood has also been very considerable. The density of population in Rio Grande is about 12 per square kilometer, with 34 in the old colonial zone on the hills, and 6 in the frontier plains of the west.

The white man in Rio Grande is the result of three human currents that have reached its territory since the eighteenth

century: the military colonization by paulista elements in order to keep territorial continuity with the Colonia do Sacramento in the River Plate, the Azorian colonization, systematically adopted by Portugal to people the plains and shores of the southern frontier province, and the European colonial contribution of Germans and Italians, in the nineteenth century. There are great analogies in this ethnic formation with the La Plata Republics, as described in their cultural relations by Rudiger Bilden. The contact with the Spanish groups has also deeply influenced the indigenous culture of Rio Grande.

The color proportions are more or less the same as in São Paulo, though the immigrant inflow has not been so strong. The "coefficient of homogeneity," as Bloom Wessel calls it, that is to say of marriage within the same ethnic group, is still greater in Rio Grande than in São Paulo. The birth rate that was, we are told, extremely high among primitive Azorian settlers, is today more favorable to immigrants than to gauchos. The fact is that the native is the gallant warlike cattle breeder of the Pampas, whereas the foreign colonist is the small farmer, who settles in the northern mountains of Rio Grande to till the soil.

The highest percentage of whites, however, is recorded in Santa Catharina: 85 per cent whites, 11 per cent mulattoes, 4 per cent negroes.

IV. THE NEGRO QUESTION

The interesting fact about the "race problem" in Brazil is that there is no race problem in that country. Professor Rudiger Bilden studied the case in Brazil and wrote about it in *The Nation* in 1929.¹

¹"Brazil, Laboratory of Civilization," by Rudiger Bilden; *The Nation*, New York, Vol. 128, No. 3315, Jan. 16, 1929, pp. 71-76.

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After enumerating the fundamental types of mankind that live in peace, side by side, he says, "Legal barriers between these groups are of course wholly absent. Social discrimination is slight and based on individual preference and class. . . . The predominantly white upper class, largely descendant from the old slave-holding aristocracy and hence imbued to a certain extent with the tradition and psychology of the latter, refuses in the majority to mix by marriage with persons obviously of colored origin, although a certain percentage has done so in the past and still does, primarily for the same reasons that urge members of the oldest English and German nobility to marry Jewish heiresses. This animus works far more against the negro than against the Indian, because the stigma of servitude rests chiefly on the former."

In Brazil there is no class prejudice to speak of, so literal overlapping is tolerated when it corresponds to real social service. Yet the whites have dominated for centuries and still do: they are the upper classes where mixture is an exception, though a half-caste is not an outcast. So intermarriage is more frequent in a lower social state. The darker the skin, the lower the class, as a rule.

"The Negroid element," says Bilden, "is handicapped, moreover, by the fact that the abolition of slavery, while constructive, was not constructive to the point of freeing it from its dismal and insidious heritage." This turns out to be an advantage to the white immigrant, since he can more easily improve his status and economic position when in competitive work with the negro.

The colored man's situation in Brazil may perhaps better be understood if we recall the chief social consequences of Abolition, in 1888.

1. It was a decisive encouragement to immigration by which the influx of white stock secured a definite and ever-increasing superiority to the southern states.

2. Economically, as well as socially, and perhaps politically also, the substitution of free hired labor for slave labor transferred to the paulista districts the pre-eminence in coffee production, since the necessity of paying wages made it no longer profitable to raise coffee in worn-out zones.

3. It broke down the old social structure of two classes: the restricted elite and its large proletarian base, both living on agriculture. The free play of demand and supply substituted for the artificial competition of non-hired work the real competition of free and hired labor. An intermediate class was thus allowed to rise, as a small bourgeoisie, developing its resources and improving its status and standard of living. The consequence was the formation of a new market for new industries that needed protection, tariffs, development: in fact, a new economy for a new society.

4. Although abolition had been gradual, the last decisive step was sudden. It took the coffee landowners by surprise and upset completely their economic life. This caused a political upheaval and led to the disruption of the Imperial regime. The coffee-picking season was at hand and the negroes left the fazendas to congregate in towns; many landowners were thus ruined and withdrew their support from the Monarchy. The same thing happened in Texas in 1865 when General Gordon Granger proclaimed the freedom of the slaves on the eve of a cotton-picking season. The changed institutional conditions consolidated the moral position of the enfranchised black man but did not help him very much in a practical way.

5. Abolition spelled ruin for many planters; slaves left the estates and crowded into towns. A proletarian urban class was thus formed for industry, transportation, and commerce, but city life, especially in the south, did not prove favorable to negro development. Untrained, unskilled, uneducated,

he was frequently the victim of disease or vice; the first generation of free negroes paid for social experience.

6. Deprived of slave labor, patriarchal life in fazendas had to be given up. No more lazy youngsters, idle girls, family privileges. Economic readjustment was necessary in nearly every family. Paternal authority declined though pre-war conditions preserved a few vestiges that soon disappeared.

7. Abolition did not bring civil war or class hatred, but a very low educational pattern did not prepare the negroes for modern life: by nature or by heredity, they stayed in perpetual minority: lazy, improvident, illiterate, and poor, but respectful and submissive. Well-treated by the good-natured whites, the Brazilian negro has still a low degree of morality in sexual relations. No one seems to care whether his marriage is within the law or not. Hospitals, asylums, dispensaries register a high percentage of colored people as patients. Selection often spells elimination for the negro.

8. Abolition has further altered the status of the black man by restricting his activities as a rural worker and shifting him to domestic attendance, as household servant, waiter, or messenger, seldom as a skilled worker. But he has no consciousness of class.

In the history of labor in Brazil, the negro has been disappearing little by little ever since his part as pioneer in tropical agriculture came to an end. Abolition thus definitely marked the close of an economic and social era of Brazilian society.

The sociological aspect of the race question in Brazil today appears evident: race antagonism is a class prejudice, a phenomenon of status, of categories of thought. We depend upon our categories, especially for our knowledge of human beings. Every person we meet finds a place in our minds in some defined category: friend, relation, neighbor, stranger,

etc. He falls automatically into it, and we are very little conscious of it. Our "opinions" are justifications and apologies for slight deviations from views orthodox in society. "Opinions are individual, but the attitudes upon which they are based are collective."¹ In 1928, Professor Robert Park wrote:²

First of all we ordinarily confuse racial prejudice with racial antagonism. There is probably less racial prejudice in America than elsewhere, but there is more racial conflict and more racial antagonism. There is more conflict because there is more change, more progress. The Negro is rising in America, and the measure of the antagonism he encounters is, in some very real sense, the measure of his progress. The fact seems to be that racial prejudices do not always and everywhere express themselves in racial animosities. Animosity arises in conflict, and racial animosities are an incident of the struggles in which racial classes are formed. When, however, conflict ceases; when some sort of accommodation of the contending is achieved, animosities subside. In that case the sentiments change. They are no longer hostile, or are only potentially so.

That seems to explain our case clearly enough. There is probably no less race prejudice in Brazil than anywhere else; but as the enfranchised negro has not risen to substantial culture and his multiplication is not economically encouraged, as President Theodore Roosevelt wrote in 1922, there is no antagonism, no animosity.

In sociology, prejudice is, after all, just a slight, almost unconscious resistance of our minds to any change in the social order. Americans permit any man individually to rise and thrive, but when a whole class is trying to upset social organization, the prejudice takes the form of animosity. It is, as Robert Park says, just an expression of conservatism.

¹"The Bases of Race Prejudice," by Robert E. Park, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CXXXX, Nov. 1928, p. 12.

²*Ibid.*, p. 13.

III

THE STORY OF BRAZILIAN COMMERCE

I. TIME AND SITUATION

WHEN the Portuguese navigators discovered Brazil, in 1500 (so the story runs), Portugal was already in her third cycle of geographical discoveries; the first had been the Azorian cycle in the earlier half of the fifteenth century, the second, the South African cycle up to the Cape of Good Hope turning-point, the third was the Brazilian cycle—the starting of a new era. Pressed hard by Spain on her eastern boundaries, Portugal, the balcony of Europe, providentially turned to the open seas, lured by the Atlantic islands, Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde; Portugal was predestinated to find Brazil, but not at the proper time nor in the proper situation and position.

Time and situation appear as the two main factors that carry the possibilities, the opportunities, the necessities out of which history is made. When we say “time,” it is not only pure chronology, it is “social time,” the moment or epoch of a certain knowledge, advancement, and equipment; by “situation,” we mean the possible contacts, physical and social, the interdependence in human affairs.

Under these conditions it might be said that Brazil was discovered at the wrong moment for Portugal, in untimely situation and position, for it was out of the way to India, it was too far to the southwest in the “Tenebrous Sea.” The Portuguese of King Manuel were far more interested in Asia,

they needed Indian products far more; besides they were not in demographic conditions to start a settlement; yet they feared competition in the New World. Thus they were led to postpone "the discovery" as long as possible and therefore kept their mysterious knowledge of the Overseas in absolute secret; a decree of King Manuel forbade the reproduction on historical maps of certain details held as secrets of State. The discovery of Cabral in 1500 was just the official discovery, when mystery could not be kept any longer without danger of being outwitted.

These facts explain why the occupation of the Terra de Santa Cruz, the Land of the Holy Cross, did not thrill the Portuguese or modify in any way their commercial activities. For some time Brazil was to be "forgotten." Yet something did interest them in their new possession: the dye-wood, called Brazil wood, a tincturing substance imported from the Orient and known in Florence since the twelfth century as *verzino*. It was so much more important than anything else that the Christian faith was put aside, says a historian of the time, "by diabolic arts that changed the name of Holy Cross, so pious and devout, for the name of a tincture for dyeing cloth."

It was, however, a great moment in the history of mankind: the Revival of Learning and the Great Discoveries. It brought also the compass, the printing press, and a commercial revolution started by capitalism. Still, Portugal was busy elsewhere; if not scientifically, at least politically unprepared, and not sufficiently equipped for so great a task in the New World as the colonization and future exploration of Brazil. That is why the exclusive trade of Brazil wood was at once leased by the Crown to a rich Jewish merchant of Lisbon, Don Fernando de Noronha, on fair and profitable terms for the Royal Treasury.

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It was under such unfavorable conditions that the story of Brazilian commerce had to begin. It seemed as if Brazil had been allotted by Fate to the wrong metropolis; that time and situation were working against us. No doubt private expeditions were fitted by Portuguese nobles of broader views; most of them, however, came to grief. The stories of Diogo Alvares, the *Caramurú*, of João Ramalho, and of the so-called Bachelor of Cananea are semi-legendary episodes that only underline the official indifference of Lisbon.

But the French of Dieppe and Honfleur under King Francis, the Spaniards under Charles V of Germany, and the English pirates became interested and interfered with the Portuguese monopoly, and determined King John III to start in 1531 the real occupation of the country.

II. COMMERCE UNDER THE COLONIAL REGIME

Two different phases may be discerned in the colonial regime that was enforced in Brazil by the Portuguese metropolis: one before the Spanish Domination and the other after the Restoration, that is to say, after 1640. In the first phase, the main features to be emphasized are the liberal spirit in which monopoly was applied and the real efforts of Portugal to devote all her care to the American Colony, spending money, lives, and energy for its sake. During the second phase, the Kings of the House of Braganza had learned the Spanish lesson, and everything in the Colony was to be sacrificed to the interests of the mother-country.

Unfortunately the first phase, 1531-1580, did not last more than half a century. Portugal started considering Brazil as a settlement colony and not as a mere trade factory like her African and Asiatic possessions.

The kings of the great dynasty of Aviz adopted towards

their colony a wise policy of liberty. Agriculture and industry were free: a decree of 1591 restricted commerce to the Portuguese merchants, with the royal approval, but there were no vexatious measures, duties were small, taxes moderate; there was great freedom of movement for individuals. The system was well in advance of the general ideas of the time.

It has been repeated by historians that the granting of captaincies or royal concessions with considerable political power to captains-general or donatarios, was a feudal regime applied to Brazil. Roberto Simonsen, however, has a different point of view: instead of being based on a social class division, it was an economic process of exploitation in a modern society, with perhaps rather capitalistic features, though the hereditary clause of the concession might have been misleading.

Brazil had started her commercial life by sending to Europe dye-wood, Indian slaves, and parrots. After 1520, the sugar cycle of her history began, and by the end of the century there were already 120 sugar mills in Brazil. Besides the 40,000 tons of sugar of her annual exportation, she used to send to Portugal tobacco, and import slaves from Africa.

By becoming a Spanish colony she provoked the hostility of the Dutch. The monopoly system was implanted according to its Spanish interpretation of *mare clausum* and gave to the Dutch attempts the aspect of a fight for liberty and *mare liberum*. For the year 1649 saw the establishment of commercial exclusivism in favor of a private corporation chartered in Lisbon, the Companhia de Commercio do Brasil, which lasted until 1720.

III. ENGLISH TRADE WITH BRAZIL

Though England never insisted on breaking the monopoly rule and having a direct trade with Brazil, for her merchants

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in Portugal already shared Brazilian trade, the great Portuguese colony soon became one of the chief factors in Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations, and its importance can be traced by the increasing part Brazil took in the Portuguese Empire.

Before 1580, that is to say, before Spanish annexation, there were no special interests for England in Brazil; during the domination, the Armada episode transpired. But after 1640, commercial and political ties secured the predominance of England, and from about 1756 onward, Brazil became the chief factor in the commercial relations of the two European powers.

Let us have a closer view of the details of those commercial exchanges. During the first period of colonial rivalry, to 1580, Portugal used to get sugar from her new colony, after having previously brought it from the Indies and Barbary. Yet William Hawkins sailed to Brazil in 1530 apparently without arousing the jealousy of Portugal. Tobacco was later freely imported from Brazil and smuggled into England; raw sugar was obtained in the same way by London sugar dealers. Spanish annexation did not affect the growing trade with Brazil, though Mendoza advised in 1582 that English ships should be sent to the bottom. In 1587, however, fifteen ships sailed to Brazil with woollen goods, glass, and hardware; the returns were coarse sugar, molasses, and dye-wood.

Had not the attention and activities of England been drawn to their own North American colonies, it might have greatly affected the situation of the new Spanish colony at this time. What the English did not attempt seriously—for the capture of São Vicente was just a temporary aggressive measure against Spain—the Dutch did, and to a certain extent were successful, for they occupied an important part of the northeastern coast up to 1654.

BRAZILIAN EXPORTS UNDER THE IMPERIAL REGIME

1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1884	1903
Coffee	Coffee	Coffee	Coffee	Coffee	Coffee	Coffee
Sugar	Sugar	Sugar	Cotton	Sugar	Sugar	Rubber
Cotton	Cotton	Hides	Sugar	Rubber	Cotton	Hides
Hides	Hides	Cotton	Hides	Hides	Rubber	Cotton
						Cocoa
						Tobacco
						Maté
						Sugar

When political independence was restored, and we recovered our Portuguese nationality, in 1640, there was already in Lisbon a large community of English merchants who became and long remained the real agents of Brazilian trade with England. The powerful company, established in Lisbon in 1649, as we saw, soon became the instrument of English interests. Difficulties had arisen between the Portuguese Monarchy and the English Commonwealth, but were settled by the Treaty of 1654. English ships sailing in the Portuguese fleet were to pay us more than the ordinary duties for their goods; English merchants were allowed to trade freely with Brazil in all goods except fish, wine, oil, and dye-wood; extra ships for the fleet were to be hired in England. The treaty was undoubtedly a fine deduction from the "Navigation Acts" and exhibited, for the first time, England's ascendancy over her old ally.

Wallis Chapman in his book on *Commercial Relations of England with Portugal* shows that the Anglo-Dutch rivalry was still alive in Brazil when the English pledged themselves to protect Portuguese colonies against Holland. It was already clear that the important sugar trade through Lisbon was the only way for Portugal to make returns to England, as the imports to Portugal were twice the amount of Portuguese exports to England.

The Methuen Treaty of 1703 was another step in English ascendancy over Portugal. It did not affect us directly, but the great increase in Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations which followed was chiefly due to the development of Brazil.

A few years before, Brazil had entered the gold cycle of her economic history. The Peninsular trade of England increased rapidly, but the balance was largely made by profits from Brazil. On the other hand, the proportion of English goods sent to Brazil was considerable, and constituted the bulk of the trade between Portugal and her great colony. "It was calculated," says Wallis Chapman, "that on every £100 worth of goods passing from England to Brazil, 68 were paid to the Portuguese government before the returns were made to England, as the imports to Portugal were twice the amount of Portuguese exports to England."

References are made by English authors to the concession by which four English families might reside in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio. It was a privilege and a great help for merchants, though never fully applied. The English Protestants were not subject to the authority of the Inquisition as the Portuguese Jews were at the time. After the discovery of minerals in their colony, the Portuguese grew still more jealous. Direct trade was absolutely forbidden; transport of bullion was severely punished; the privilege of residence was difficult to obtain from Portuguese authorities; the mining district of Tejuco was forbidden to foreigners. Negotiations were started to persuade the English merchant to give up the residence privilege already granted to him, and force the French and the Dutch out of the country in order to stop the contraband traffic they were carrying on.

The mines and the plantations of Brazil required workers, and the degrading slave traffic between English merchants of the African coast and Brazilian landowners went on for years.

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In the middle of the eighteenth century Portugal was no longer economically independent, and the Marquis of Pombal, the great minister of King Joseph I, described the situation in the following words: "The English had conquered Portugal without the inconveniences of conquest. In 1754 Portugal scarcely produced anything for her own support: two-thirds of her necessities were supplied by England; all the trade of the country was carried on by her agents. The English monopolized even the commerce of Brazil." The English cloth trade appeared to him as ruinous to Portugal as the fictitious value of Brazilian gold.

From 1760 onwards, the new policy of Pombal tries to alter the situation; Brazilian trade becomes more important though a decrease is registered in Portuguese commerce with England. The development of cotton manufacture in England corresponds to the growing production of cotton in Brazil. But the creation by Pombal of two new chartered corporations for exclusive trade—the *Companhia Geral do Pará e Maranhão*, and the *Companhia Geral do Pernambuco e Parahyba*—prevented the English from controlling Brazilian trade and limited their share as members of the companies. Trade of Portuguese goods was favored, export of bullion prohibited; the private trader was left in a poor situation to carry on business with Brazilian merchants.

At the end of the eighteenth century there was an increasing demand for Brazilian products, chiefly sugar and cotton; the balance of exchange was reversed in favor of Lisbon, but as Portugal was growing weaker and more dependent, the development of the American colony did not greatly improve the situation. The boom of 1791 in Brazilian products was due to the failure of the French Antilles to supply tropical goods, a consequence of French revolutionary affairs at the time.

IV. THE BRAZILIAN KINGDOM

The European entanglement in which Portugal was helping England provoked the Napoleonic invasion and the flight of the Portuguese Court to Brazil in 1807.

A great date in the history of Brazilian commerce is 1808: soon after landing, King John, then Regent of the Kingdom, opened our ports to international trade. The monopoly system was over, and a Royal decree established also industrial liberty, of which Brazil had been deprived since 1785 in order not to compete with Portuguese industry.

Great Britain derived great benefit from this act, for she was the only power with a large commercial merchant fleet. The next year import duties were removed for raw material and machinery: another advantage for the British.

Rio de Janeiro, replacing Lisbon politically, became also economically the center of the Dual Monarchy. "Portuguese trade with India and China," says Oliveira Lima, "was localized in Rio, where re-exportation to Lisbon and other European ports was organized. Exports to other parts of America were also, for some time, managed in Rio. On account of the difficulties that had arisen in the River Plate, all the traffic to Buenos Aires and Montevideo passed by the Brazilian capital."

At that time commerce with Asia was rather important: 20 to 40 per cent of the imports of Bahia were from Asia and especially China around the Cape of Good Hope. Brazil exported cloth, sugar, tobacco, and wines to African colonies. Our direct contact with Asia, especially by way of Macao, has left many vestiges among us: even today Oriental articles, china for instance, are much appreciated.

But the great event in commercial policy of the Kingdom was the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1810. A general tax of

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24 per cent ad valorem had been the import duty on foreign goods. In 1810 it was reduced to 16 per cent for Portugal and to 15 per cent only for Great Britain. It was a diplomatic victory for Lord Strangford, the British minister; Sumter, the American minister in Rio, who had hoped that the new economic liberty granted to Brazil could be the stepping-stone for closer commercial relations with the United States, was truly disappointed and explained in a report to the Department of State in Washington, September 30, 1810, the reasons for British pre-eminence in South America.

The Treaty of 1810, described in its preamble as a "liberal system of Commerce, based on reciprocity and mutual convenience" was "the most unfair and ruinous that has ever been passed between two independent nations," said the Portuguese statesman Palmella. As a matter of fact, it proved unsatisfactory to both sides, for, after all, Great Britain was never able to reap the advantages that were granted; on the other hand, Brazilian products similar to colonial British products were barred on the British market.

V. IMPERIAL PHASE: AN EVOLUTION

Independence did not modify very considerably the economic status of the country; but the restoration of peace in Europe had determined other powerful nations of the Continent to obtain from the newly-recognized Imperial Government some of the privileges that had been granted to Great Britain.

One of Britain's competitors was France, which in 1816 had sent an agent, Luxembourg, to Rio, to negotiate a commercial treaty. Ten years later, in 1826, the first agreement was signed with her. French goods were much in favor, though freights were high, and as tropical Brazilian products were not admitted in competition with those of

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French colonies, sailing ships to France were loaded with the best Brazilian woods as ballast.

The French treaty was the first of a series of commercial agreements with the different European countries, the United States, and the River Plate Republics, 1826-1828. It was a sort of standardization of our trading regime, and its economic conditions proved satisfactory for about eighty years. It was only in 1907 that we started remodelling our commercial understandings.

The evolution of commerce during the Empire is illustrated mostly by successive tariff reforms. Brazil instituted her first tariff in 1828, under the initiative of Bernardo de Vasconcellos. Rates were made uniform, with a duty of 15 per cent for all; monopolies were suppressed, commercial liberty was established. It was a kind of free-trade regime under liberal principles that were still unknown on the European Continent.

But that free-trade experiment did not last more than sixteen years. Protectionism was enforced in 1844, though the tariff of Alves Branco of that year imposed duties of only 30 per cent. Two purposes as usual were then in view: financial help to the State and economic protection for industry.

It would take too long to describe the plans intended to be carried out by the half-dozen tariff reforms that followed 1844. There is no doubt that besides the considerations of revenue, the steady and progressive evolution towards protectionism, culminating in the 1887 tariff, encouraged the establishment of industries.

In the first decade of the Empire, importations exceeded exportations. During the fifties there were oscillations in the balance, but from 1861 onwards exports rose above imports with a few annual exceptions.

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On the whole, there was a general increase in Brazilian commerce. Compared to the period 1833-1843, the ten year period 1883-1893 shows foreign commerce increased in value to 600 per cent.

During these sixty years under consideration, the sources of imports were Great Britain, France, the United States, and Portugal. After 1862, there was a relative decline in North American imports in Brazil. On the other hand, the countries of destination of exports were, during the same period, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany.

The chief exports were coffee, sugar, cotton, hides, and rubber. In the early seventies, cotton took second place from sugar. This was due to the accidental circumstance of a temporary substitution of Brazilian cotton for American cotton during the Civil War between the States.

Each of these products would have an interesting story to tell. Let us consider, however, only coffee, the leading article of Brazilian export for over a century. Coffee had been an agricultural product of the country a hundred years before it had been exported, for it had been brought to Brazil in 1727, and from 1770 was cultivated in the gardens and orchards of Rio de Janeiro. In those days the markets of the world were supplied by Asia, Africa, Java, and the Antilles. With the development of the province of Rio de Janeiro, exports from its plantations began in the eighteen-twenties. By 1826 Brazilian coffee was already 20 per cent of the world's supply. In the fifties, the share was broadened to 40 per cent; the Parahyba Valley was then at the height of its prosperity. At the end of the Empire, Brazilian coffee reached 50 per cent of the total; but the adaptation of the paulista plateau with its red soil, the terra roxa, and the building of the port of Santos led Brazilian coffee to the

golden phase of its history with 80 per cent of the world's production.

The last period, "the fifth period," as Roberto Simonsen puts it, started in 1897 with accelerated but uncoordinated culture in paulista districts, causing the over-production from which we are still suffering, with all its economic, social, and political consequences.

During that period of sixty years, among the incidents of interest in our commercial policy was intervention in the River Plate markets, an economic consequence of a political episode. As the imperial government had decided to interfere in Buenos Aires and Montevideo against the dictator Rosas and Oribe, his Uruguayan lieutenant, the Baron de Mauá, an important Brazilian capitalist, was entrusted with the financial part of the contract with Uruguayan liberals. Accordingly he became interested in the economic equipment and development of Montevideo and the Uruguayan trade between 1850 and 1868. This was considered a short episode of Brazilian economic imperialism in the River Plate Republic.

Curiously enough, liberal ideas had led Brazil to interfere in the South and claim the liberty of access to her interior province of Matto Grosso by way of the River Plate and the Paraguay. Conservative ideas, however, led that same imperial government to postpone any discussion of the free access of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia by the Amazon River. Commander Mathew Maury, the well-known hydrographer and explorer, who died in Lexington, Virginia, in 1873, had written twenty years before his *Letters on the Amazon* in which he disclosed to the world the situation of commerce and navigation in that part of the Brazilian Empire. Under the pressure of world opinion and of American diplomacy, the imperial government opened the Amazon to international

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traffic in 1867. And once more appears in our commercial history the name of Baron de Mauá, who generously gave up the privileges he held by contract for the exclusive navigation of the Amazon.

VI. COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT: PREWAR—AFTER WAR

It must be admitted that under the Republican regime, from 1889 onwards, the commercial progress of Brazil, aided by a number of favorable factors and circumstances, was considerably more rapid than before: in ten years the increase was comparable to that of the previous period of thirty years.

	<i>Years</i>	<i>Annual Average Figures</i>	
		<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
Empire	1861-70	14.9	13.1
	1871-80	19.9	16.4
	1881-90	22.0	19.2
Republic	1891-1900	29.1	25.2
	1901-10	47.6	31.8
	1911-20	68.8	54.6
	1921-30	80.5	67.4

(in million pounds sterling)

In the twentieth century, however, progress has been still more conspicuous; but figures ought to be given in pounds sterling, otherwise, if stated in national currency, the depreciation of the milreis distorts the economic phenomenon, giving the increase still larger proportions.

One of the most characteristic features of our foreign trade, after the establishment of the Republic, was the considerable advance of the United States as a country of origin of our imports, and chiefly as the country of destination of our exports. There was of course, in prewar times, a rapid in-

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crease of German trade on the Brazilian market, but commerce turned more and more to America. This was due to the fact that Brazilian trade was in coffee and raw materials that were needed in the United States and admitted free.

Brazil afforded preferential rates to a number of American products. By a reciprocity agreement of 1891 certain articles of American origin were imported free into Brazil and others were granted a reduction of 25 per cent of the ordinary duty. After some years the preferential treatment of American imports was discontinued, but in 1904 it was renewed in favor of certain goods such as wheat, flour, India rubber, inks, colors, matches, etc. The idea was to keep up on the American market compensation for coffee.¹

Brazil was very much affected by the Great War, not only because her chief purchasers were involved in the conflict and had to alter the nature of their trade, but also on account of the lack of shipping. Germany was lost for a time as a customer. On the other hand, the different imports and exports were affected in several ways. Many supplies were curtailed, such as coal, gasoline, iron, and codfish. Exports, especially coffee, declined, though rubber and hides consistently retained their importance. A special stimulus was given to manganese. Brazil became rapidly an exporter of staple food crops. Though artificial, that result showed that Brazil was self-sufficient, and could easily enter the world market as an exporter of foodstuffs.

After the war there was a boom in 1919-1920 and a corresponding increase in both exports and imports. In 1920 the balance of trade was clearly unfavorable to Brazil: the buying to replenish exhausted stocks made imports much higher, and the currency suffered a first depreciation, though

¹Frank R. Rutter, *Tariff Systems of South American Countries* (Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1916).

in France and in England the Brazilian milreis appeared normal.

But the most interesting feature in Brazilian postwar commerce was the new classification of countries that shared her foreign trade. The United States became pre-eminent with imports into Brazil two and three times larger than those of Britain, and strengthened her position as purchaser of Brazilian exports at a rate of about three times those of France, the second customer.

After the boom, in 1921, there was a sudden drop and comparison with prewar conditions became unfavorable; and 1922 brought to Brazil a financial crisis from which recovery was slow. The years preceding 1930 witnessed a redistribution of origins and destinations. Great Britain recovered her prewar position in Brazilian imports. Germany joined again in the competition as buyer and seller; but the Argentine kept her newly-conquered position.

VII. THE NEW TRADE CONDITIONS IN BRAZIL

In order to understand the present position of the United States in connection with the Brazilian market we shall have to summarize the recent changes that have occurred in Brazilian economy.

After the crisis which affected the country in the twenties, the government took certain emergency measures that influenced the commercial situation and trade relations. Four aspects at least must be examined:

1. The currency question, in which fluctuations in exchange, following the depreciation of the milreis, and speculative factors, were changing trade conditions. As our gold reserves had been exhausted without preventing the decline of our money, the government decreed the creation of an Exchange Control Office through which all exchange trans-

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actions had to pass. All foreign exchange had by law to be sold to this Office at closely fixed rates. Restrictions began to be relaxed in 1934-1935, and an open market was restored. But as a substantial backlog of commercial credit was accumulated or "frozen," some financial agreements had to be arranged with certain countries, including the United States. The result was that in many countries cash was demanded as long as control remained in force over remittances.

2. A revision of tariffs was found necessary to increase the government's revenues and to readjust the duties affected by the fluctuating values of the milreis in relation to gold. The new tariff was increased in 1934. The plan was carried out in order to grant additional protection to home industry, which, by the higher cost of imported goods, felt already some security.

3. The diversification of production, as the over-production of a few crops, constitutes a danger in foreign trade. On the other hand, improved production methods, marketing by classification, standardization, and better distribution were recognized as urgently needed measures for Brazilian exports. The government interfered to restrict new plantations of coffee and destroy surplus crops; the cocoa industry was given an intelligent direction by the establishment of an institute to assure uniform classification, reduced cost of transportation, warehousing, and marketing. A Sugar and Alcohol Institute functioned in a similar manner for sugar, and corresponding institutes for maté, meat, and rice have been created with the same object in view. The result was an increasing diversity of better-equipped sources of production. Cotton and fruits were the first great exports of that new policy.

4. Commercial agreements started in 1936—the industrial acknowledgment of our new economy. In some

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countries the autarchy policy or national sufficiency has determined quotas for products imported from foreign sources. Brazil had to negotiate larger quotas for her products in return for concessions. The willingness to grant larger quotas to Brazil was helped by the desire to release credits blocked in Brazil and also by the fact that Brazilian output is chiefly of raw materials and foodstuffs.

5. Greater credit facilities, by extension of the rediscount and providing a broader field for internal securities, were other government initiatives that improved considerably the purchasing power of the country. Coal, iron, and cement were among the first privileged mining activities; but manufacturing increased also rapidly, thus influencing the internal market for foreign goods. For coffee production results were still more dramatic. It is said that large estates passed, in São Paulo, from 50 per cent of the cultivated land to 10 per cent only; it is "the transition from the large absentee ownership to small operating farmers," as Ralph H. Akerman, commercial attaché, states in his report of 1937.

The Brazilian commercial depression began in 1926; recovery started in 1935. If we examine exports in tons, we might follow the movement from 1,622,000 tons in 1932 to 3,933,000 tons in 1938. Values expressed in contos de reis also increase but values in dollars, owing to exchange conditions, show a decrease when compared with figures of 1926, for instance.

As consequences of these facts, we may mention: an increasing industrialization in the southern states, São Paulo, for example; a rapid progress in the self-supporting system of the country; the abandonment of a single crop economy and policy; and a resultant new economy that may alter the international trade relations of the country. Yet key industries are still missing.

VIII. THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

The most interesting part of the dislocation of the world market can be traced to the contribution of the United States. Since coffee had reached paramount importance among Brazilian exports, the United States became a purchaser of this product on a large scale. A Brazilian writer, Nelson Sodré, has recently said:

The history of Brazilian commerce might be described in three decisive stages: the Lusitanian, the English, and the American. The first predominates in colonial times and during the Kingdom. The second involves the Empire down to 1870. The third starts in 1870 and comes down to us. Each one of them is marked by the pre-eminence of trade transactions, with Portugal, with England, and with the United States. To emphasize the importance of the pre-eminence in political and social events of the country, it is sufficient to study the period in which each of them predominates. The colonial institutions were essentially Portuguese. The imperial ones had living features marked with British (an experiment in parliamentary regime). With the cropping of democratic and liberal ideas at the end of the Empire, the increasing importance of the United States of America is revealed by their larger share in Brazilian Commerce. The transaction regime thus leads to imports of political ideas and state institutions.

As a general statement this may be a half-truth, but in the present case it does certainly explain also many non-commercial features of Brazilian social life in evolution.

Great Britain, France, Germany, Argentina, and Belgium are the most important purchasers and suppliers of Brazil. Yet until recently, 1934, the United States was the unchallenged leading supplier of Brazilian requirements. This position of pre-eminence emerged during the war and lasted over fifteen years. But in 1934, Germany started improving her position substantially, and overtook Great Britain in 1935. Two years later, in 1937, she succeeded in overtaking the United States as well. From 51 million pounds sterling sold to Brazil in 1920, American exports declined to 6,400,000

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in 1935. Happily the Brazilian exports to the United States did not suffer so much, yet they fell from 44 in 1920 to 13 in 1935.

In Millions Sterling

Brazilian Imports from

	<i>United States</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Argentina</i>
1920	51.9	5.8	27.1	6.8	10.5
1925	20.7	11.7	18.7	4.9	9.8
1930	12.9	6.1	10.4	2.6	7.1
1935	6.4	5.6	3.4	0.9	3.5
1937	9.3	9.6	4.9	0.9	5.6

Brazilian Exports

1920	44.9	6.1	8.7	12.8	7.0
1925	46.4	6.8	5.1	12.9	5.5
1930	26.5	5.9	5.4	6.0	4.4
1935	13.0	5.4	3.0	2.6	1.6
1937	15.3	7.2	3.8	2.7	1.9

Certain commercial reports might be examined with interest in order to understand the present situation, and forecast future developments.

1. Agricultural equipment and machinery constitute a group of American imports greatly needed by Brazil, though tropical agriculture is still very unsatisfactorily equipped, plows, tractors, incubators, seeders, etc. This is not only because rudimentary methods prevail frequently, but also because the small farmer as a rule has very limited buying power. The lower-priced German equipment has thus reached the more modest farmer and supplanted American merchandise in many cases. On the other hand, the recent expansion of cotton culture has been beneficial to American ginning and baling machinery. As Brazil suffers from a

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shortage of rural labor, it is probable that labor-saving devices will be required very soon. The present campaign to promote production of wheat will certainly have similar consequences.

2. Automobiles, trucks, motor-car accessories, and motors form the most important of all groups of American imports into this country. Brazil has only 160,000 motor-cars, just about as many as Japan, fewer than Belgium, Sweden, or New Zealand. It may be stated that 95 per cent are of American make. The Brazilian market, had we a greater purchasing power, should be the most important in the world on account of the size of the territory, the distances, and the lack of transportation facilities. It has accordingly been considered advisable by several American firms to open in our principal centers assembly plants that today are supposed to supply 80 per cent of the total passenger-car sales. Then also we find since 1936 the competition of the cheap German motor-car.

3. Aircraft and accessories have been supplied to the Brazilian Army exclusively by the United States. But with the development of commercial and civil aviation, many competitors have entered the market: French, German, Italian, and British. Of course, European competition has been waved aside for the time being, but is still in the air.

4. Coal has a dramatic story in Brazil: formerly it was a sort of privilege of Great Britain to supply us from Cardiff. The Great War shifted the mission of coal-supply to the United States. Then Great Britain joined again, and from 1930 onwards took the commanding lead she had lost. Suddenly, Germany rose as a successful competitor, selling directly and indirectly through Holland. In 1937, the positions were, respectively:

Germany: 711,000 tons

Great Britain: 664,000 tons

United States: 141,000 tons

Of course American coal is always preferred by American-owned public utilities, but state-owned railways and other business organizations purchase German coal in order to free the blocked credits accumulated in Germany from the exports of Brazilian products. That was the "compensating" system we could not avoid.

5. The wheat and flour story is another page of past Brazilian-American transactions. For years and years, the largest imports were from the United States and special rates were granted by Brazil. Slowly but consistently, the Argentine entered the market, first in the southern states, as being closer than North America, then in the central states. Today the Argentine sells more wheat and flour, in tons, than coal is bought from England and the United States, 940,000 tons in 1937. It was also here a question of lower prices, and with government measures to stimulate domestic flour milling and wheat production in the southern states, there is little possibility that the lost ground will ever be regained.

6. Electric machinery and equipment form a group of supplies of great variety. An American lamp factory emigrated to Brazil and further curtailed importations, till Japan came in with still cheaper lamps. Refrigerators, radios, and household appliances have had a large market opened by the installment system, very much used in Brazil. In many cases there is an assembly plant in the country that lowers the cost. Anyway, the income of the average middle-class family, though rapidly improving its standard of living, is still limited.

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Air-conditioning apparatus, though used in some public buildings and picture-palaces, is not favorably accepted on the whole. The resistance is perhaps due to very old habits of permanent apertures in houses, or to routine, or to the high cost of an improvement not yet quite adequate.

7. Iron and steel consumption is increasing rapidly, for Brazil is in her industrialization phase; but Germany was a powerful competitor. The same could perhaps be said about chemicals and dyes. In that case, however, the competitors and American firms have opened branches in Brazil, and the emigration of industries has turned most of them into perfectly acclimatized domestic industries, Palmolive, Barbasol, Pond's, etc.

8. Machinery, road building, and rolling stock show once more how German methods of lower prices, compensation, and long terms of payment have been successful in overcoming the reputation and quality of American equipment.

In conclusion, it may be said that the first phase of Brazilian-American relations is over: wheat flour, fruit, semi-manufactured products, and so on, are past. In the second phase, with the supply of other types of merchandise such as motor-cars, gasoline, iron, oils, electric equipment, films, and machines, these trade relations are still withstanding increasingly severe competition from industrialized European nations. The German case is significant and full of useful lessons.

Ralph Ackerman, commercial attaché, wrote advisedly in 1937: "Whenever Brazilian exports to Germany tend to exceed purchases from Germany, the proceeds of the export surplus are accumulated in Germany in the form of blocked credits which can be used only for the purchase of German merchandise. As it is not to the interest of the Brazilian Government to maintain a large credit of this kind, there has

been a tendency for Government-controlled companies to divert their purchases to Germany in order to liquidate the outstanding credits."

Now that the postwar experiment is over, and we have a chance of rewriting the whole story, what is going to happen in the next chapter of Brazilian-American commerce?

IV

PRESENT TRENDS IN BRAZILIAN EDUCATION

I. THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND

LATIN culture is supposed to be the spiritual background of all South American countries. It is a cultural link that makes them feel akin to one another; it is perhaps the only link of such a nature, more theoretical than real, sometimes more intellectual than sentimental. It represents a cultural complex of literary, legal, political, social, and religious elements with only very slight or even doubtful racial connections. It is a residue of Roman law, of Roman state, of Roman family and religion, with a Latin speech to express it and a Mediterranean behavior to interpret it.

As a former colony, Brazil has inherited from Portugal the Portuguese language. That explains to a certain extent the linguistic isolation of the country in the continent and some peculiar political features as, for instance, our long-preserved unity and a more pronounced nationalism. The expansion of the metropolitan language on the South American continent reached the political boundaries of Portuguese occupation. If, on some frontiers, there is a certain bilingualism, as in Northern Uruguay, Portuguese is of frequent use among landowners.

For centuries the Tupi language of the Indian natives, an agglutinative speech, was more common in the colony. Up to the eighteenth century it stood in relation to Portuguese in the proportion of 3 to 1. The catechistical work of the

missionaries accounts for the spreading of the Tupi "lingua geral." Even today, in Amazonia, it is still largely used by the natives.

The influence of African dialect on Colonial Portuguese was also considerable between 1532 and 1800, because of slavery. Yet it was far less than the Tupian.

Therefore it is easy to explain the differences between the Brazilian Portuguese and the original Peninsular language. The accent is marked in the pronouncing of certain vowels that are almost mute in Portugal. The vocabulary has more Indian and African words. The syntax allows a greater freedom in the position of pronouns. Animals, plants, weapons, dishes, drinks, and dances have terms unknown in Europe. At any rate, with the growth of population and communication facilities and the spreading of knowledge, the language of common speech is approaching the written literary language more and more every day.

There are no dialects in Brazilian Portuguese: the unity of language is remarkable.

Brazil has a literature of her own, quite independent of modern Portuguese influence. Scientific production, in several branches, shows rapid growth under the influence of education. Since 1930, there has been amazing progress in production of books.

The falling of Brazilian exchange had made the purchase of foreign books more costly; the widening circle of the elite, with 20 towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, had prepared new markets for native publishers; the growing needs of industrialization and economic development had diverted public attention from purely imaginative literature to more urgent intellectual problems.

In consequence, law, political science, history, and medicine are at present the chief specialized departments in

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Brazilian production. Even pure literature is today influenced by social research and geographical environment.

As Brazil had practically no war of independence to fight, and was separated from Portugal with the consent of the Portuguese King, the colony was without ill feelings toward the mother country, and accepted the Portuguese heir-apparent as Emperor. This explains the establishment of a monarchy in that part of the continent, and its duration for seventy years.

It has been said that our two Emperors ruled Brazil during the minority of the people. I dare say it is perfectly true. The imperial policy proved able to keep together the rather dissimilar parts of the Empire, and worked for internal peace and unity. The first part of our independent life was a relentless struggle to maintain a unity which in other South American countries the nations were fighting to secure.

It is therefore easy to explain that the imperial regime has never been the object of any feeling of hostility in republican quarters. Visitors are sometimes surprised to come across imperial coats-of-arms or effigies on our bank notes, coins, and stamps; names of institutes, streets, and monuments still keep imperial memories alive all over Brazil. These fine recollections are not supposed to endanger our republican institutions. The heir-apparent and the princes of the imperial house meet the President of the Republic and his family on most friendly terms in social entertainments and even in official ceremonies. That would seem impossible in most of the European republics.

It would not be wrong to say that nationalistic feelings, stronger in Brazil than elsewhere in South America, owe a great deal of this strength to imperial traditions.

Other influences at work in the background of our Latin culture were exerted by the religious mentality of the

Roman Catholic faith. The fact that for centuries the Roman Church was the only established church with practically no competition in Latin America, explains the powerful hold it still has on the population at large. It is now, however, more of a tradition than an actual determining factor. With the republican regime, direct connection between state and church was discontinued.

The Christian creed had been, to a certain extent, distorted in its orthodoxy by contact with negro and native fetichism. The result was, early in colonial times, a formal interpretation of religious ceremonies, practices, and observances, with a corresponding deterioration and enfeeblement of the doctrine. The indifference that prevails today arose especially in the upper classes, where philosophical ideas of French origin led to disregard and omission, but there is no anti-religious feeling of any consequence. In a Voltairean society, where religious practices were restricted to women and children, tolerance became the rule and the influence of the church declined. The clergy has not shown capacity to restore the lost position.

After the Great War there was a genuine Catholic revival in the country, and with the opportunities of the 1930 Revolution some determined zealots claimed, on behalf of tradition, the right to interfere in family and educational legislation. They were helped by some speculators in lip-devotion, but did not succeed in modifying the prevailing indifference of public opinion.

II. EDUCATIONAL BEARINGS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The only thing that might be said about the racial problem in Brazil is that such a problem does not exist in the country. There are, indeed, various racial types in our population, but few of them are really pure. It would be rather difficult to

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fix the type of the average Brazilian. There are Indians, several hundred thousand, but they are still far from being integrated in the national life. There are over two million negroes. There are whites of European extraction. The mixture of all these elements has been far more rapid than in the United States. The absorption of the colored stock by Portuguese immigrants is a well-known fact that has been of great help in solving the problem.

No outward manifestation of race prejudice is ever registered, nor can it even be observed, so relations are smoothed by friendly intercourse. The class distinction that leaves the colored man on a lower level of the social scale is based on economic difference and has a cultural consequence: there is no need of special education for negroes. Promiscuity of races is almost limited to the primary school; negroes feel no need for special schools nor for higher educational institutions.

Racial prejudice does not affect social relations in general, but operates against intermarriage; the upper class does not permit intermarriage, though it may be found in the lower middle class. On the other hand, the half-caste, if less eligible, has by no means an inferior social status; he has the same opportunities as the white. Many mulattoes have reached an outstanding position in literature, art, and medicine. This fact must not be disregarded in educational work.

"On the whole," says Rudiger Bilden, an intelligent observer of Brazilian society, "discriminatory tendencies are held in check by the liberal and humane attitude generally prevailing in the country."¹

The fact is that in Brazil the average colored man has not taken advantage on a large scale of the educational oppor-

¹Rudiger Bilden, "Brazil, Laboratory of Civilization," *The Nation*, Jan. 16, 1929, p. 73.

tunities open to him. He does not appear as a keen competitor for higher places; he is less ambitious, less active, and more submissive than in other countries; besides, biologically, he seems to be the weaker element in our population.

The race problem does not exist because there is no ill feeling on either side: the negro, at the ballot box is a citizen, in the workshop a manual worker, in the home, usually, a servant. That's all there is to our race problem.

It is a remarkable fact in modern history that Brazil, with such large tracts of territory, has been able to preserve her political unity. In the colonial phase of her history, the captaincies had closer connections with the metropolis than with one another. The present autonomy of the different states of the federation has therefore a traditional base in the past. During the imperial period, unity was maintained, for the occasional uprisings were unconnected, local, and sporadic. The central government had ably established the primacy of the metropolis. The republican regime restored something of the old structure, but there never was a serious plan for secession. We had, however, two or perhaps three uprisings that might be called revolutions, in 1893, 1930, and 1932: none of them seemed to have aimed at the break-up of unity. The after-war troubles started in 1922. Three presidents had to cope with rather serious difficulties, induced by new social ideas, commercial world-crises, and a shattered coffee-economy of Brazil.

In its general features, the revolution of 1930 might be defined as a reaction against professional politicians and state oligarchies, against squandering of public funds, against a pervading indifference to national problems and maladjustment of the administrative machinery. The leaders of the revolutionary movement had to face a reconstruction of the social order according to the new economic situation of the

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world, in which Brazil seemed rather behindhand. Discontent and unrest had cooled down; a substantial part of the program was being accomplished: social and educational aspects of the problem had to be faced.

The Republican Constitution of 1891 granted to the states a great number of rights, and the federal government was left with comparatively little control over the states. Among the privileges of the state political unit was legislation on primary education and cooperation with the federal government in other branches of education.

The reaction of 1930, besides being a shifting of political influence towards the left, strengthened the position of the federal government against the states. The paulista episode of 1932 was, as a civil war, the manifestation of past state independence.

The educational reforms that followed 1930 and the constitutional enactments of 1934 and 1937 have been logical consequences of these centralizing forces in the political sphere.

On the other hand, in the economic sphere, there are educational bearings that help to an understanding of our cultural position. First of all, we might recall that Brazil is still an agricultural country, almost self-supporting, and endowed with considerable natural riches, which are far from being explored in a systematic way, that is to say, full advantage has not yet been taken of these natural resources—a condition due chiefly to low density of population over a very extensive territory, and also to transportation difficulties and rather limited possibilities of financing economic enterprises.

In consequence, the laboring classes still show a low standard of life. There is no unemployment to speak of, but wages are low. Fortunately, the purchasing power of

Brazilian money, though depreciated in foreign exchange, is still normal within the frontiers, and, little by little, the effort toward improvement and increase of comfort is to be traced in all social classes.

For the last thirty or forty years improved methods have been introduced into practically every field of economic activity. Tools, equipment, and all sorts of apparatus, as soon as accessible, are immediately adopted. This shows that our people are not backward hopelessly and by nature, but on account of their weak point—the pocket. They know well enough what is good and how to use it, and they do believe in spending money provided they get it.

Under these circumstances there are some striking features that bear educational consequences.

1. There is, in the first place, a progressive industrialization in the chief urban centers of the republic. Brazil is an agricultural country with respect to international exchange of commodities, but an industrial country with respect to internal commerce. To a foreigner, São Paulo is the land of coffee, for the Brazilian it is rather a manufacturing center that supplies him with cotton goods, shoes, hats, silks, and manufactured goods of all sorts. That is why depression has not so deeply affected Brazil. There is, therefore, a growing demand for technical knowledge and, to a certain extent, also for skilled labor. The vocational schools are developing rapidly.

2. Competition for positions in civil service and private business is increasing amazingly. There are new types of examinations, with tests and practice that attract every day a larger number of candidates.

3. Urbanization, or the trend of population towards towns and capitals, has a many-sided influence, brings more opportunities, diversifies life and occupation, and, therefore, asks for more education.

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4. Foreign influences act also in a powerful manner by example and suggestion. The movies, in a couple of hours, picture new life adjustments, new opportunities, and enlarge the horizon by travel.

As a result of these different features of economic life there is a diffused desire for new experience, more varied necessities, in a growing population that is struggling to get out of a single crop economy.

To say that with material progress Brazil is growing rich and therefore needs more culture would not state the whole truth. It is more than that: it is a new phase in the world economy that brings to Brazil, the traditional coffee-growing and only coffee-growing country, a new economic order.

As a result, the economic stage has educational bearings that involve the changing status of the individual in a changing world—a social phenomenon as well as an economic one. The new generation has more ambition, needs more independence, and therefore gets more responsibility. There is only one solution to the situation: more education.

III. CONTEMPORARY CURRENTS IN EDUCATION

The task of education in Brazil has always been to provide culture for diversified social groups in an extensive territory, belonging to a united nation rather thinly scattered over a great area. The nation has its special obligations: in its melting-pot of all types of immigrants, assimilation has to be thought of as a capital part of the educational process; no feeling of racial superiority ought ever to be encouraged; the value of democracy has to be adequately ascertained and the practice of its institutions widely emphasized.

As the country is far from having exhausted its natural resources, and has not yet arrived at its definite position in world economy, education is bound to take into considera-

tion the manifold possibilities that are open to its citizens. What part of traditionalism is to be preserved in such a rapidly changing order? That is the educational problem in Brazil today.

For an agricultural society of the patriarchal type, settled in a new tropical country, with extensive land properties to be tilled by colonists with the help of slaves, there would be, of course, a peculiar system of education. The case was perhaps the same in the southern states of America. The home, with all the family, the household, and the "aggregates," constituted an isolated, self-governed economic and social unit. Instruction was given by the family or by members of the restricted community under its control.

Soon, however, the church interfered and found her help necessary in the education of the future leaders belonging to the upper class. It was especially in the eighteenth century that the Jesuit fathers opened schools and colleges, the influence of which was unique in the social organization of the country. Under the administration of the Marquis of Pombal in Portugal, there was a strong reaction against the Jesuit ascendancy and a first attempt was made to bring public instruction under lay organization.

With independence and monarchy, the educational system was not much altered, but the guidance of the elite was emancipated from Portuguese influence. For a while, during the reign of the first Emperor, there was a slight Austrian influence on scientific fields of study: it was due to the personal action of Dona Leopoldina, the Austrian Empress.

But French influence early became the leading factor and lasted the whole century. It is a well-known and understandable fact that French thought has always had an unchallenged ascendancy in Latin countries.

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After the colonial period when the Portuguese influence was pronounced, the country began to model its culture on the Latin culture through French thought. At first critical and revolutionary thought derived from the encyclopedists, and then political thought with its influence on the elite, attracted more and more the attention of leaders to French culture. All that vocational training which made modern France a leading industrial and agricultural country escaped the attention of the Brazilian elite, accustomed to manage their estates, their factories, or their public affairs; their interest was primarily intellectual. Every plan for reform which was directed against this tendency, whether under the Empire or the Republic, failed without exception.¹ It was impossible for the son of a rural gentleman, a politician, a public official to look forward to any other career than law, medicine, literature, or politics.

Work was done by artisans or rural laborers. Before abolition the latter were slaves, and among the former group also many were slaves, although a considerable number were free men belonging to the lowest classes. Under the Republic both these groups belonged to the poorer classes, whether natives or immigrants; the latter increased rapidly in numbers, especially in the South. The problem is much the same throughout Latin America.²

The second Emperor, Pedro II, was a philosopher and a scholar himself; he persuaded his contemporaries that public education was his cherished occupation. In fact, he built many schools, worked for higher learning, standardized secondary education in the college that still bears his name, founded in 1838. The College Pedro II is, even today, the standard secondary institute of the federal government.

During the Empire, down to 1889, several laws were passed, many reforms were made, but the same spirit of selective examinations and humanistic background persisted; the French interpretation of culture for the few prevailed in all of them. Occasionally, missions were sent to France, to Switzerland, to Germany, or elsewhere, to study methods and processes, but innovations were almost impossible be-

¹Ruy Barbosa, *Reforma do Ensino Primario* (Rio de Janeiro, 1883).

²A. Carneiro Leão, "Brazil," *Educational Yearbook* of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, 1936, edited by I. L. Kandel (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City, 1936), p. 79.

cause the reports and the reformers always met in office statesmen unaware of the true problems and unwilling "to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them." The Lancastrian type of teaching became popular in Brazil, however, and interesting reports were written by teachers. The whole question was summarized in 1883 in a remarkable report of Ruy Barbosa on public education, but, as a matter of fact, the situation was not altered, and the report remains as a literary document.

When republican statesmen came into office and the new constitution was prepared, the French influence took the shape of a positivist interpretation, and, although a short-lived ministry of public instruction was created, the most orthodox Comptist views prevented any substantial change in the educational system.

Happily, in private education the Catholic influence balanced to a certain extent, for boys and for girls as well, the stiffening atmosphere of positivist principles; progress in education was at any rate made possible.

Many educational reforms were passed from 1900 to 1931, but they all dealt with the formal aspect of the problem: with programs, examinations, and diplomas. There was no re-definition of aims, of social purposes, of methods of teaching, of training, or curricula.

To understand Brazilian education one has to remember that elementary education has been considered a local question, controlled by the municipality or by the state, and given in public schools. Secondary education, on the contrary, is almost exclusively a private business, only controlled by the federal government as far as credits are concerned. Higher education is of a mixed type: shared by the Union, by the states, and by private initiative, but also controlled by the federal government for the granting of professional titles.

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During the last ten years, most significant changes have come to pass. Before saying anything about the Reform of 1931 and the Constitution of 1937, we must call attention to certain leading influences that have recently been felt.

It is interesting to mention as one of the important influences on Brazilian education of recent times the work of North American missionaries. It started in São Paulo, and later spread to Minas. One of the prominent personalities involved in this movement was a teacher from Boston, Miss Marcia Brown, whose activities in São Paulo can still be traced in many a school. Missionary action is responsible for the foundation of a certain number of institutes and colleges that still thrive in Brazil, as Mackenzie College and the College of Piracicaba in São Paulo, as O'Granberry Institute, the Hendriks and the Baptist College in Minas; Bennett College and others in Rio de Janeiro. Though especially aiming at secondary college education, they have been representatives of a time-honored American educational system of the end of the nineteenth century. Little by little they had to conform to the peculiarities of the Brazilian educational laws in order to have their diplomas legally recognized by the state.

The early republican governments in São Paulo were under the control of enlightened statesmen like Prudente de Moraes and Bernardino de Campos, who thought that education would be the most valuable background for true democracy. Their attention was thus drawn to the work of schools under the guidance of American principles. The fact explains why São Paulo became, for some time, the pedagogical center of the country and had so great an influence throughout the country. In eight states of the Union, public education was officially remodeled by missions of São Paulo; in perhaps ten more states were professors of São Paulo

individually engaged for teaching. It happened that, being the emperor-state in the Union, on account of the considerable resources of the coffee industry, São Paulo made large expenditures on its public school system. In this respect it was not surpassed by any single state.

After a certain time the American contact was lost and the paulista system developed in isolation. But even then many features could be traced to their American origin, and a Brazilian teacher, Dr. Lourenço Filho, who had been superintendent of schools in São Paulo, with almost half a million pupils, visiting Philadelphia in 1935, was surprised to find there the original type of many of our paulista schools.

All over the country, however, the processes of teaching crystallized, and a sort of routine replaced the impulse of renovation. São Paulo continued to develop its own educational plans, to extend geographically its area, to multiply its schools, to prepare a greater number of teachers, but no technical improvements or better methods were devised, and the capital function of the primary school was adherence to requirement of the three R's.

The World War had a considerable influence on the alteration of educational systems in all countries, and Brazil was no exception. Many social and economic problems revealed the inadequate education given to a society in such rapid transformation. In Brazil, two revolutionary upheavals, in 1922 and 1924, were, to a certain extent, the expressions of that deficiency. New ideas were then discussed; inspiration for new experiments was coming from abroad, from European countries principally; Swiss, Germans, Belgians like Ferrière, Claparède, Decroly, and Kerschensteiner, began to be known and widely read in French and in translation. It is worth noting that 90 per cent of our teachers read French very easily.

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, the reform of Rocha Vaz,

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enacted in 1925, established a system of secondary education with a six years' course, and placed the national department of education under the Ministry of Justice. To the federal government was given the right to establish elementary schools in the states. There had been an interstate agreement of 1921 to accept federal aid for popular education. Carneiro Leão was the head of municipal education in Rio when Dr. I. L. Kandel, of Columbia University, paid his first visit to South America. Kandel heard then how much Horace Mann, Dewey, Thorndike, Barnard, and Kilpatrick were studied by our teachers. The reform movement put forward, more clearly perhaps than before, the social aims of education. The test problem was discussed and criticized; but there was still a certain lack of insight and the routine was a powerful obstacle. Up to 1923, only doctors of medicine had been supposed to understand educational problems and to handle them: professionals or technical men were looked at askance when in office.

In 1927 there appeared in São Paulo, Lourenço's book, *Introduction to the New School* and, for the first time, a general view of the capital questions involved in the progressive school movement was given to the Brazilian reader. For the first time methods and techniques were explained and widely disseminated. It was also a happy fusion of European ideas and American theories of education. "While changes have been taking place in education in other countries because of changes in civilization, the expansion of industry, and the growth of science, the main educational interest of statesmen in Brazil since 1927 has been to provide literacy for the masses and academic and professional training for the elite. Vocational education came later and was only partially organized."¹

¹A. Carneiro Leão, *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

These were the tendencies in Brazil when the so-called Revolution of 1930 occurred. A paulista teacher, Fernando de Azevedo, was at the head of the public schools in Rio; very efficient work was done in Minas Geraes by Francisco Campos; Carneiro Leão was remodeling the educational system of Pernambuco, and Anísio Teixeira of Bahia was studying education in Columbia University.

It was indeed a brilliant and very active period that opened in 1931 with the creation of a ministry of education in the federal government, with Francisco Campos called from Minas to organize it, and with the coming into office, in the Federal District, of Anísio Teixeira, in 1932.

The progressive school movement was centered thus in Rio de Janeiro and irradiated to other states. It gave great importance and meaning to the Rio system of education where a rapid evolution was felt under the untiring activity of Anísio Teixeira and his staff. Huge modern schools were built, school attendance was doubled, the teaching profession was made a real career, the study of technical problems of control, efficiency, methods, tests, and guidance were centered in an Institute of Educational Research, a remarkable Institute of Education was equipped as a Teachers' College, which under Lourenço Filho attracted visitors from all states as a standard institution. At last, the University of the Federal District was created by Anísio Teixeira and some foreign teachers were engaged to lecture in Rio.

Ten or twelve professors who were helping Anísio Teixeira's reforms had been like himself in the United States, and the drastic changes that were made, the crop of educational books, reviews, and publications, the new methods and processes, to say nothing of the new spirit that prevailed, revealed the strong American influences that were at work in Rio de Janeiro from 1932 to 1935, when Anísio and his

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friends left office. The opposition to reform had grown, the routine interests were helped by a strong Catholic wave, and the innovators were accused of being extremists. The forward movement was stopped, but not all was lost. Little by little, after concessions to the philosophical doctrines that still had a hold on some leaders, alterations and readjustments were made, according to scientific views of experts and technical men.

In São Paulo, the curious fact was the contrast between the old American influence of forty years ago, petrified today in a hopeless routine, and the new American thought that does not discuss Miss Brown's good work in the past, but contends that if she were still alive, she would be a progressive teacher.

In the federal field of action, the Reform of 1931 was almost an alteration of details in the national system of public instruction, concerned with secondary and higher institutions only. New curricula, new programs, new time-tables were the gist of the whole plan, but the spirit was practically the same. The Francisco Campos reform, as we call it, was, however, the best plan we ever had. Courses, subject matter, control, examinations, and administration were still devices for social selection, and very little was attempted to make a broader system of education reach a larger part of the population. Besides, the scientific study of education was in no way encouraged and conditions for learning as well as teaching were not made easier or more accessible. The training of teachers was theoretically foreseen, but practically postponed.

At the secondary school level, the six years' course was replaced by five years and two complementary years, called "University College." The aims were still the same: to provide the student with a sufficient humanistic background

for the professional faculties of law, medicine, and engineering. The new faculty of education, sciences, and fine arts was created, but not until 1939 did it start working, under the more classical name of National Faculty of Philosophy.

The reform, as a whole, did not alter the situation very much. It improved some courses by a more adequate distribution of subject matter; it gave a larger autonomy to the university, but the French system prevailed, and it was in no way a reform of systems, methods, practices, and purposes. As such it could not be compared to the elementary school reform that the city of Rio had framed and executed.

In 1934, a new constitution was passed by the Constitutional Assembly; it was the second since 1891. A step forward could be traced in that new charter: it included a chapter on "Education and Culture" with ten articles establishing the way in which the Union, the states, the cities, and private initiative might join their efforts for educational ends.

One of the important features of that new code was the inclusion of optional religious instruction in public schools. It submitted all educational systems of the different states to federal control, through a "National Plan of Education." The so-called "liberty of the chair" was granted, and a definite percentage of local budgets was theoretically secured for school appropriations and funds. Election to the teaching profession was on the basis of competitive examination.

In the present Constitution of 1937, the new state has taken an even larger share in the responsibility for national education. Federal cooperation and help is generously anticipated. Vocational education is especially considered (Art. 129). It is too early to say how these constitutional provisions will alter the old system, but the hopeful view is that nothing will prevent the development of social aims in

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education. Anyway, the new trend is to centralization, and to the endowment of the federal government with national powers in the field of education.

It may be noted that lately to discussions on educational matters all the different currents of public opinion have contributed. The Catholics, the Progressive Education movement, the associations and societies of education have been heard and their views freely published. Among the most important was the Brazilian Education Association, founded about sixteen years ago by a group of teachers, who worked for new ideals and improved methods. Today the Association has real prestige and leads the way to progress in education. In 1930, twelve Brazilian teachers were selected to study in the United States and visit schools and universities. Besides the Brazilian Education Association, there were many other societies in Rio and in the states. Dr. Carneiro Leão has written for Dr. Kandel's *Educational Yearbook of 1935* a historical aperçu of our most important societies concerned with education.

The original tendencies in our administration of education were to move toward decentralization and to commit secondary education chiefly to private initiative. In the Constitution of 1934 there was an article (151) establishing the duty of the states and federal district to "organize and maintain within their territories educational systems on the lines laid down by the Union." The new Constitution of 1937 does not fix a national plan of education, but seems to prepare the educational field for a more centralized action under the control of the Union. A larger place is given to vocational education (Art. 129). Primary education is compulsory and the federal aid is clearly determined. Up to now, the intervention of the federal government has been rather slow on account of distance, budgets, autonomy, and

other accepted reasons. Since 1938, federal action has granted aid to the southern states especially aiming at a more active nationalization policy.

In the present educational system there is a Ministry of Education and Public Health with four departments: executive, accounting, information and statistics, and education. There is a National Council of Education and a National Institute of Pedagogical Studies, established in 1938. The different sections of this institute are: records and interchange, research and inquiries, applied psychology, professional guidance, biometrics, and a library.

Some of the research work of the Institute of Pedagogical Studies, under the able direction of Professor Lourenço Filho, has been published recently, giving a summary of conclusions in which the new features of Brazilian education since 1930 are clearly outlined.

It is gratifying to note that index numbers of the period 1932-1936 compared to the previous 1927-1931 give a satisfactory view of increase on the following lines:

1. A general increase of the school system including number of schools and enrollment of pupils on the different levels.
2. A considerable diversification of types of schools; in fact the increase in general education was 28 per cent, whereas in special education—normal schools, commercial schools, home economics, and schools of art—68 per cent.
3. Progress was far more significant at the secondary level, 42 per cent, than in primary and higher education, 30 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively.
4. A considerable number of municipalities took up educational institutions, especially in zones of foreign immigration.
5. The figures of promotion and graduation in secondary education practically doubled.

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6. The number of teachers increased, especially at the secondary level, 46 per cent, and, accordingly, there was a proportional growth of expenditure on schools.

These general statistical considerations suggest certain consequences and reveal significant tendencies.

The development of school attendance is more rapid than the growth of population, and can be compared only to that of the period 1889-1893, when republican government was established in the country. The new ideas on special education, longer period of school attendance, and spreading education on a larger scale in all social classes, seem now to be favored by the state and coming into practical operation.

Several quotations of Professor Carneiro Leão's contribution to the *Educational Yearbook of 1936* will better describe the changing situation.

Preschool education is not systematically organized in Brazil, although the majority of states have a few years of what are called maternal or infant schools, but without any definite theory such as is found in kindergartens or French maternal schools.¹

Until 1932 no educational system in Brazil provided either continuation schools or extension courses. There were, however, available for the poor, adolescent and adult training courses in arts and crafts provided by education societies and philanthropic associations, but such courses known as *Liceus de Artes e Ofícios* were found only in large cities.²

Vocational education is still in process of development, as might be expected in a country in which industrial organization is recent and restricted.³

Secondary education in Brazil has always been influenced by the French system, and the chief end of secondary education has always been preparation for higher education. There has never been an education appropriate to the needs of one of the most critical periods of life, adolescence. . . .

The chief criticism of secondary education in Brazil during the past forty-six years of the Republic has been directed against the absence of a specific purpose and the lack of solid and connected knowledge provided for youth. Until 1925 the system was called preparatory, that is, preparatory to the universities. A pupil could study as few or as many subjects

¹*Loc. cit.*, p. 94.

²*Ibid.*, p. 99.

³*Ibid.*, p. 100.

a year as he chose, pass examinations in them, and continue to prepare for further examinations without any correlation or sequence in the subjects chosen. The wastefulness of the procedure was subjected to severe criticism.¹

These descriptions of the situation by Dr. Carneiro Leão show the task that was before statesmen and educators of the country a few years ago, and explain how the different problems had to be attacked.

We have seen what the figures disclose in connection with the four-year period, 1931-1936. Though not yet available, the data of 1936-1940 will certainly show further improvements, for the same principles are still prevalent among us, though a great many changes in the personnel have unfortunately deprived Brazilian education of some outstanding administrators and leaders.

According to Professor Lourenço's interpretation, two different drifts have appeared in Brazilian philosophy of education in the past. The first one was the view held by preachers of the three R's, in a crusade against illiteracy, for the magic of elementary knowledge as the only way to create public opinion and control the state accordingly. The second was the doctrine of the "preparation of the elite," of the selective power of higher education, and of the mandarin to guide or perhaps drive the masses. Our educational institutions were pretty good results of these two diverse tendencies. As our patriarchal society had lacked a middle class in the past, so the middle level school also was not missed.

"The creation of a medium culture," says Professor Lourenço, "formed through the development of secondary and vocational education, was not a problem duly considered by statesmen and educators."

The last ten years have deeply modified, first, the philo-

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 103-4.

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sophical principles that guide education in Brazil, secondly, institutions, methods, processes, and teaching devices, as well as curricula, programs, time-tables, and extra-curricular activities. Today four universities—Brazil, São Paulo, Minas, Porto Alegre—have quality rather than quantity in view. Elementary education is still progressing in numbers, in methods, in activities, but secondary education has only lately attracted the attention and interest of the administration. A centralizing tendency is manifest in secondary education; its problems are considered under more scientific points of view; its social purposes are better understood; private initiative is still encouraged but is not exclusive; a higher preparation for its teachers is being required with a selective process in appointments; a better articulation with possible shifts to commercial, vocational, or art education is evident; and its rural aspect is under examination or experiment. In conclusion, it might be said that the most significant feature of Brazilian educational evolution is the earnest purpose of the present attempt to modify our notions on secondary education and organize it on new lines, all the other problems appearing, for the time being, as dependent on an appropriate solution of the central question: education at the medium level.

V

THE NEW DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL

I. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA

SOME very skeptical thoughts were written over twenty years ago by Miss M. P. Follett in her stimulating work on *The New State*.¹ Let us quote at random a few phrases of her Introduction:

““Representative government,”” she said, “party organization, majority rule, with all their excrescences, are dead-wood. In their stead must appear the organization of non-partisan groups for the begetting, the bringing into being, of common ideas, a common purpose and a collective will.”

What she points out as the political error of our age is that “no government will be successful, no government will endure, which does not rest on the individual.” But she adds that “up to the present moment we have never seen the individual.”

She points out it is not by sending more men to the ballot-box, nor sending them more often, that direct government will find the individual. “Democracy,” she says, “is not a sum in addition. Democracy is not brute numbers; it is a genuine union of true individuals.”

The question that seems to be the base of the whole problem is sociological, for Miss Follett finds “the true man only through group organization. The potentialities of the indi-

¹M. P. Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1918).

vidual remain potentialities until they are released by group life. Man discovers his true nature, gains his true freedom only through the group. Group organization must be the new method of politics because the modes by which the individual can be brought forth and made effective are the modes of practical politics."

What has often been overlooked is that the man, when he votes, does not represent a particular, theoretical, or abstract self, but a whole complex of his life relations, activities, and interactions. He votes as the representative of a whole, of a complex social entity, of a group life. Let us therefore get at the group if we need the individual.

In a couple or more sentences of the same author we detect her sociological argument: "Thus group organization releases us from the domination of mere numbers." "The technique of democracy is group organization." "The group organization movement means the substitution of intention for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire."

Her criticism is that "To-day the individual is submerged, smothered, choked by the crowd fallacy, the herd theory" and her advice is that "The first reform needed in our political practice is to find some method by which the government shall continuously represent the people."

Since I am no politician, I shall merely try to interpret the most recent features of our constitutional evolution in Brazil. If I have insisted on quoting Mary Follett's Introduction, it is because the expressions she used seem to fit so well as explanations of our present situation. We have been struggling for a new democracy in Brazil, and the result has been a new state. What are the connections of this state with democracy—that is the point I wish to discuss succinctly.

A century ago, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, discussing the "Use and abuse of some political terms," defined democracy

as a "government in which either a majority or a large portion of the people have, by means of the right of election, an influence on the appointment of members of the supreme power." The fact that, for instance, the Athenian commonwealth had a strong percentage of slave population and that not one-tenth of its inhabitants partook of the supreme power, has never prevented political historians from considering Athens as a "splendid achievement" in democracy.

Nowadays, democracy is a multifarious form of society that does not admit of universal application. Every nation, under some aspects at least, is democratic; even kings are described as democratic.

There is, however, a tendency to make distinctions between political democracy, social democracy, and economic democracy—forms which do not always coincide in the same state. It seems that, in the past, political democracy was unduly emphasized, the governing body being the only one taken into consideration. The conquest of political rights by the people has blurred the sharpness of its interest, whereas new forms of democracy are being aimed at in social evolution. Besides, pure democracy is no longer practicable, unless the community is of small size and relatively undeveloped; the only kind of democracy possible is an indirect or representative one, where people are present only by proxy, whether there are one or more degrees of election. But even a representative government might not be democratic; suffrage is too much restricted.

In any event, one thing must be noted: the political-economic-social life of a big modern nation has developed in such a way that today the burdens of democracy are excessive and, as Professor James W. Garner puts it, "their tendency is to go to extremes and to devolve upon the electorate tasks which by reason of their character and multiplicity the peo-

ple are not competent to discharge satisfactorily through direct action." The democratic control of foreign policy, for instance, might lead to disastrous consequences.

The real characteristic of contemporary democracy, resulting from the wideness of its aims, political, economic, social, is the new spirit, the socialized aspect it has assumed in the twentieth century.

"In two aspects," says Walter E. Weyl,¹ "the democracy towards which we are striving differs from that of today. Firstly, the democracy of tomorrow, being a real and not a merely formal democracy, does not content itself with the mere right to vote, with political immunities, and generalizations about the rights of man. Secondly, it is a plenary, socialized democracy, emphasizing social rather than merely individual aims and carrying over its ideals from the political into the industrial and social fields."

A Brazilian jurist, Dr. Francisco Campos, Minister of Justice and one of the authors of the present Constitution, has emphasized the contrast described in the above quotation from Walter Weyl's book of 1912. To him, democracy has chiefly four meanings nowadays: it is first the suppression of privilege; it is also equal opportunity for every citizen; it is further the utilization of capacities; and lastly, it is the largest diffusion of material and moral goods. The essence of democracy is the organization of the state according to the will of the people and the functioning of it with the cooperation, action, and frequent interference of that same people.

It is a widespread opinion in Brazil that democracy is by no means a monopoly of the liberal state theory. In many cases, liberalism has distorted the democratic practice by allowing class struggle, party strife, personal ambitions and interests, excesses of individualism and even demagoguery. It

¹Walter E. Weyl, *The New Democracy* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

might not be irrelevant to explain the traditional restlessness of Latin American Republics by the use and abuse of liberalism in the interpretation of democracy in political life.

We believe that very often democracy is not defined by its values and its aims, but rather, as Francisco Campos puts it, "by its ways, by the processes, by the machine, by the technique or by the different contrivances through which politicians forge public opinion or devise legal substitutes for the will of the people or the nation." There is, of course, no relation between the democratic machine and the democratic ideal. The more elaborate the mechanism, the more difficult it is for the people at large to understand its working, and the greater are the opportunities for the professional political middleman to interfere between the government and the people, to draw profits, advantages, and privileges that thwart the free play of real democracy.

The equality of opportunity is reduced to an equality of suffrage. When the vote has been cast as a formal manifestation of democracy, the substantive rights—to work, to health, to security, to well-being—are baffled, for they are all supposed to be included in the ballot-box. "When the vote is cast," says Campos, "relations between the citizen and the state are over."

There is no doubt that democracy has been the aim of many political devices and that many political mechanisms have been imagined and included in constitutional laws, such as universal suffrage, parliamentary systems, referendum, rotation in office, suffrage for women, recall, secret suffrage, and so on. Yet there is only one control for the whole machinery: it is "pressure from without"; it is public opinion and all the extra-constitutional devices of a truly political vitality.

Brazil has been independent for over a century. We had

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the Imperial Constitution and the Republican one. The first lasted sixty-five years, the second forty years. A new Republican Constitution was passed in 1934, and was succeeded by the present Constitution of 1937. Let us examine briefly to what extent these several constitutions were adequate to our needs, adapted to our customs and habits, in conformity with our spirit and our tradition, and the result of our experience and practice in political life. Constitutions cannot be adapted from foreign patterns as ready-made clothes; they have to be made to order to suit the customer and allow him to keep a free and easy control of his usual movements. This seems evident, and theoretically it is; in practice, however, we do not realize it so clearly, because of a very understandable tendency to generalization. Wearing collar and tie, buying the morning papers, and having afternoon tea, does not result in conformity of feelings and thoughts, in similarity of tastes and needs. Euro-American culture is multiform, according to ethnic types, latitudes, and opportunities.

II. CAUSES OF THE 1937 MOVEMENT

In her very interesting work on *Dom Pedro, the Magnanimous*,¹ Dr. Mary W. Williams of Goucher College has written some expressive words on our political life during the Empire. She entitles one of her chapters, "Dom Pedro's Struggles with a Premature Political System." The whole problem is thus stated in a nutshell. I could quote, of course, any number of Brazilian contributions on the subject, but this recent book by a prominent American historian of South America seems most suitable to my present purpose, provided I am allowed to quote freely, in order to give the true interpretation of her conception.

¹Mary W. Williams, *Dom Pedro the Magnanimous, Second Emperor of Brazil* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1937).

"The Emperor was, from the first, handicapped," she says, "by a clash between the political facts of the country and its political ideas. Though the Brazilians who were interested in government wanted a democratic system, they lacked the experience and self-discipline needed to make such a system work." In fact Brazil was, at the time, a very sparsely inhabited country, in which the population lived still in a semi-patriarchal way, in large tropical-agricultural estates, with slavery, general illiteracy, few social contacts, and many more shortcomings.

Therefore Dr. Williams does in no way calumniate us when she writes: "But no one knew better than he (the Emperor) that the Brazilian nation, largely illiterate and only recently permitted to experiment with self-government at all, was quite unready for the democratic political system of Great Britain, where representative government existed for more than five centuries. But, in the interest of harmony, he tried to make the best of the existing situation." Further, we read the following statement, backed by numerous Brazilian writers on political subjects: "During much of his reign, the Liberals and Conservatives had but a small membership and failed to stand consistently for clear-cut principles of government. They did not to any marked degree represent public opinion or currents of national thought." "Thus the Emperor let unpreventable frauds bring about party changes. But for the sake of harmony he kept up the fiction that the deputies represented the will of the nation."

As to what has been called in our history "dictatorship of morality," she adds that Dom Pedro exercised it benevolently and permitted, as well, the pretense of a cabinet system.

So the safety of the Empire was entrusted to the "Podér Moderadór," the moderating power of the Emperor.

Although things did not stay perpetually in the same con-

ditions, but changed and evolved, that was nevertheless our political experience of nearly seventy years of imperial regime. I admit what Herman G. James says,¹ "Democratization of the government would probably have spelled anarchy in Brazil as it did in all the Spanish American states after independence. The half century of Dom Pedro's reign afforded two generations of practice in politics and allowed a gradual and orderly transition from the monarchy to the republic."

Now what was the experience of the other half century of republican regime? Influences of bookish culture had led our statesmen of the imperial era to ignore the people and the country in preparing a constitution modelled on European ideas and practices. Those of the Republican period were not more original nor keener observers of the realities of our situation; they copied the United States instead of Europe, and so was framed our first Republican Constitution of 1891. "It was said," wrote Madeiros e Albuquerque twenty-five years ago, "that the presidential regime that had given to the United States their magnificent prosperity would certainly do the same for Brazil."

The suddenness of the revolution, in 1889, had found the country unprepared for the new institution. Deprived of the imperial political elite, the republican statesmanship was unaware of the conditions and necessities of the people. There was no matured plan; there was plenty of utopian ideology but no organic idealism based on Brazilian realities. Besides, it was a decidedly critical moment in the nation's economy, provoked by the agricultural crisis following the abolition of slavery.

Soon did the founders of the new regime complain that "it was not the Republic of their dreams."

¹Herman G. James, *Brazil After a Century of Independence* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 143.

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The deepest reason, however, of the unfitness of that constitution was the lack of an organized public opinion. There was no "pressure from without," no training in self-government, no class solidarity, no party interests of significance, no feeling of collective well-being to be conquered and maintained. "Conditions of vitality for such a regime," said Oliveira Vianna, "could only be compared to those of a guinea pig under a vacuumized glass-bell."

It would be a natural question for us to ask: how did such a political system work for exactly half a century? It lasted because it was distorted, from the very beginning. Every one of our thirteen presidents had his own way of managing the situation; and the bomb exploded in the hands of the thirteenth president, just a couple of weeks before he was to leave office, at the end of his legal term.

The empire had been the period of pre-eminence of the "moderating power" of the monarch; the republic had shifted, theoretically at least, pre-eminence to the "legislative power." All the democratic formulae were expressed: "sovereignty of the people," "liberty," "federation," "universal suffrage," "division of powers," and others.

Such institutions, however, were precarious, for they had no strong public opinion to back them. The formation of an effective public opinion in Brazil has been delayed by the geographical factors of distance and isolation, by the social factors of traditional paternalism of a patriarchal civilization, by psychological factors of indifference and apathy, by economic factors of helplessness and destitution in the hostile environment of a luxuriant nature. Invaluable racial qualities, both individual and social, have developed in Brazil; peaceful orderliness, kindheartedness, and discipline are perhaps Brazilian virtues, but aggressive vitality and spirit of cooperation have not yet reached their full develop-

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ment. Culture, now spreading rapidly, was slow and unassisted in the past.

Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to realize what political parties could be.

President Getulio Vargas said in his speech of November 10, 1937: "Our old parties, as well as our new ones in which the old had merged under new labels, had no ideological expression; they stood under the shade of personal ambitions or local influences for the sake of groups merely interested in sharing spoils and in propitious combinations, with inferior objectives. The capacity of resistance of the regime disappears and the pacific contest of the ballot-box is transferred to the wild field of armed conflict. In some states, electoral preparations have been replaced by military preparations. The regional 'caudilhismo,' under the cover of party organizations, was arming in order to force upon the nation its decisions, thus positively threatening national unity."

The so-called parties, instead of being national expressions of broad, general classes of professional interests to inform and guide the executive, were always clusters of petty individual profiteers at the expense of the nation's cause. They were clans, with bosses seeking advantages or protection. Only two or three times in our whole history did they happen to represent a truly collective interest—independence, abolition, and abdication. Otherwise they just worked for the "mediocrization," if we may say so, of the governing elite, for the crowding of official positions, and for useless political agitation. The deputies in the federal parliament did not seat themselves according to party lines; they sat in *bancadas*, that is to say, in groups by states under the leadership of the state deputy that represented the state political "situation," as it was termed. The grouping had to obey political instructions and vote accordingly. The opposition of the state some-

times represented a minority. So the federal government could only work with the support of the state coalitions, giving cabinet posts to influential states and not to the ablest men, with very rare exceptions, as in the case of Rio Branco.

Never was it possible to read a single party program, with principles, ideas, plans, or suggestions for political action, till in 1934, they cropped up by dozens, just because the second Republican Constitution recognized proportional representation, and the electoral code determined the minimal condition for parties to be officially recognized. It was a regular pulverization of public opinion. Of course, it was an artificial device to create parties where the natural conditions did not allow them to thrive on normal lines.

No public opinion, no parties, no collective interests adequately represented, no landowners, no working class, no bourgeoisie, no industrial groups voicing their wants and aspirations; a whole nation standing aloof and leaving political activity to groups of professional politicians: that was about the situation of the country half a century after the emperor had departed.

How could a presidential regime work in such an atmosphere of national indifference? The nation did not express wishes or needs, but just kept waiting—waiting every four years for a savior, a president-elect with a program of salvation. For three long years the poor man had to struggle, to compromise with the clans and the state oligarchies, in order to muddle through and reach the fourth year, in which political restlessness under the cover of electoral preparations was the activity of the readjusting group of petty interests. Happily, Brazil has been blessed with good presidents, honest men, patriotic and well-minded, who worked hard to save the country from the ills of an unsuitable constitution.

Thus, for half a century, every one of our thirteen presi-

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dents had to play the executive of a distorted constitution, according to his temperament, in order to manage for the better an indifferent people to whom government is the supreme disposer and the most unavoidable curse.

It would not be fair to say that the presidential regime adopted by our first Republican Constitution did not benefit the country in any way. The crisis of the revolution of 1889 was threatening the very unity of the nation. The full powers which the Constitution of 1891 granted to the president allowed Marechál Floriano Peixoto to consolidate the republic. Later, the same statute made it possible for our executive to develop an administrative activity of great efficiency and continuity. It allowed, for instance, President Prudente de Moraes to pacify the country; it helped Campos Salles to restore the finances; it enabled Rodrigues Alves to back the strong hand of Dr. Oswaldo Cruz in his sanitary campaign against yellow fever, to remodel and rebuild Rio de Janeiro under the Lord Mayor Pereira Passos, and to put into execution the large international plans of the Chancellor Rio Branco; it also permitted Affonso Penna to pursue a consistent policy of economic development. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the first twenty years of the Republic were prosperous, in spite of the regime that seemed to some extent responsible for such progress.

Unfortunately the system was suited only in appearance to real interests and national conditions. The maladjustment was due to different causes:

1. It bred the regional spirit in semi-independent units of the country, in very dissimilar conditions of wealth and education. There was a growing tendency to oppose the economic forces of more powerful states to the coordinating and unifying efforts of the Union.

2. It gave the right to the states to constitute, under the

name of police force, real little armies with machine guns and field artillery, thus weakening considerably the budget for federal forces.

3. It duplicated the services of justice, weakening in the same way the federal organization.

4. It yielded to the individual states practically all sources of revenue, leaving to the Union only customs duties and very few taxes. The constitutional impoverishment of the federal government hampered its action, when more and more responsibilities were accumulating in its own departments.

5. It permitted any number of restrictions on the internal market, determined by the economic privileges of local units. Interstate commerce was heavily handicapped; export taxes, import duties (these were unconstitutional, but charged all the same), and many more hindrances were commonly devised, sometimes with reactions on the international market.

The real inadequacies of the regime appeared in 1910 when for the first time there was a contested election for the presidency. The military candidate, Marechal Hermes da Fonseca, was opposed by the civilian party headed by Ruy Barbosa. Had the constitution fitted Brazilian social conditions, it would have been a normal and peaceful contest. In fact it showed a certain political vitality; currents were felt in public opinion; ideas and programs did not mean much, but there were some contrasts in attitude. Happily no revolution resulted from the victory of the military candidate, but as a consequence of it, a new policy was inaugurated to reduce or subdue the state oligarchies that were thriving unconstitutionally in different states, especially in the northern ones.

Up to 1910, one of its distortions that made the constitution workable was the compromise of the Union with the

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state family and relation groups or oligarchies that held all offices and monopolized all privileges. It had been started by President Campos Salles under the name, "Policy of the Governors," as the only way to secure for the federal executive the indispensable support of the states for his financial reconstruction scheme. These oligarchies, as extra-constitutional excrescences, were violently opposed and many of them had to give way. Unfortunately most oligarchies, dispossessed in 1911-12, were changed for new ones no better qualified, sometimes worse, and with much less political training for the situation.

The ruin of local oligarchies, under President Hermes da Fonseca, deprived many states of the one form of guidance and direction that expressed an organic reaction of unprepared social elements.

Another extra-constitutional element was the extraordinary political force represented by the vice-president of the Senate, Pinheiro Machado, who headed a party of his own, called the P.R.C. (Conservative Republican Party), and acted as the grand elector of presidents and their adviser in political combinations. For nearly twenty years the mysterious prestige of that "lord protector" lasted, unexplained and autocratic, vitiating the fair play of the constitution through the hold he had on parliamentary and legislative activities.

After 1912, hypertrophy attacked the executive, and a decidedly rapid decline became noticeable in Congress. As technical problems appeared more frequently, the Legislature avoided discussion of them and began to give wholesale powers and authorizations, approving indiscriminately drafts and bills from the government. Congress showed thus a docility comparable only to its revealed incapacity. National interests were yielded to clannish disputes and struggles for personal advantage.

After the Great War, a much stronger executive was found to be rooted in our presidential system. The election of the president became therefore a far more important event in the political life of the country; every three years a serious crisis was impending. The permanent opposition of those who had no chance of controlling the governmental machine was transformed into a revolutionary attitude as there was no workable constitutional solution as an alternative.

The first rebellious movements started in 1922, when the so-called "Republican Reaction" headed by ex-president Nilo Peçanha opposed the election of Arthur Bernardes. The episode had different revolutionary outbursts, yet it would be difficult to find an idea, a principle, or a program, for the most dissimilar elements joined in a rather confusing way to antagonize the official course of action. It seems that instinctively, without plan or preparation, the civic spirit of the people was seeking a form of expression in unconnected and unconscious convulsions. At that time some Marxist ideologies made their way among the leaders of the defeated movement, as they lived in the River Plate capitals, where they gathered as refugees. Later on, the fascist creed also converted some other discontented elements. The Bernardes presidency had to be suspicious, autocratic, and repressive: it was a period of suspense; his successor was hailed as a savior.

Unfortunately financial difficulties, the severe coffee crisis, the consequences of depression, questions related to our industrial progress, and the adoption of foreign ideologies made the term of office of Dr. Washington Luis the very test of a liberal-democratic possibility among us. Opposition grew stronger, it had learned the lesson in revolution: it took on the character of an organic movement. As it was said, the revolution was "articulated": instead of splitting public

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opinion or the mass of the people, as in 1910 or 1922, the cleavage was between states: Minas Geraes and Rio Grande do Sul, aided by small Parahyba, which had grievances against the executive, headed the movement, and revolution broke out in October, 1930.

If better organized than the previous ones, this revolution was not much richer in ideas and principles; but with the good will of some of the military leaders who interfered as conciliators, the struggle did not last more than three weeks and, for the first time in Brazil, a president was deposed.

The ease with which the revolution was accomplished was a surprise to everybody, even to the revolutionists; it proved once more the inadequacy of the institution destroyed and the public indifference to its overthrow. Nominally the victory belonged to a party called the Liberal Alliance. The leaders were heading a very heterogeneous crowd. A social historian, Azevedo Amaral, called it a "mosaic of discontentments." Of course, victory was to bring more confusion than clearness to political action: liberal-democrats, communists, Catholics, reactionaries, and militarists showed the most diverse and opposed tendencies and ideas, which they hoped to see followed by what was expected to be the "New Republic." They had joined to fight personalism and individual power, but in order to reorganize government they had to concentrate power in the hands of a civilian dictator.

It was no easy task for Dr. Getulio Vargas to manage the political situation, avoiding clashes, holding enthusiasm within bounds, moderating reformers and, chiefly, forbidding reprisals and retaliation. We needed at that moment a man with great psychological capacity for objective analysis, unwilling to display dramatic effects, cool-headed, and without animosity or vindictiveness. By chance it happened that such

a man was the appointed dictator for three and a half years.

Between 1931 and 1934 Dr. Vargas had very few assistants; with tactful firmness he had to put aside many of his supporters and gradually eliminate the conspicuous revolutionary reputations of some who, without right to them, held positions of political responsibility. For over three years Dr. Vargas worked honestly to restore constitutional order in a new liberal-democratic regime.

The most important episode of that period was the São Paulo revolution of 1932 against the federal government. The São Paulo leaders considered themselves victims of the 1930 upheaval that had deprived the Brazilian empire state of its political pre-eminence, as the economic leader of the country. It is difficult to say what were the plans of São Paulo in 1932 to hasten the "constitutionalization" of the republic; in any event, they were defeated. Happily, São Paulo was in no way deprived of economic and social leadership.

The Constituent Assembly was summoned in 1933, as expected, and for the first time in Brazil, it may be said positively, we had by universal suffrage and direct secret vote a free, absolutely free election of representatives without the slightest external pressure. The Brazilian people had spoken at last! No end of hopeful speculation and expectation filled the hearts of the patriots, the well-minded citizens. Never had Brazil known such a true representation of the popular will, and discussion of the new constitution started under the most favorable circumstances of peace, security, and harmony.

In July, 1934, the constitution was given to the nation. It was of the liberal-democratic type. Every shade of political ideology had had a chance to influence the new law of the country; the tragedy was that none of these ideologies

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failed its opportunity. The Constitution of 1934 was a regular gerrymander; it "started," says Azevedo Amaral, "concerning itself with theology and ended its long-winded chain of articles by prescribing orthographic and spelling rules." The dictator was elected constitutional president, and for three more years he tried earnestly to work under that newly adopted system of liberal-democracy.

III. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1937

When the Constituent Assembly had framed the organic law of the country, and turned out to be its first Legislative Congress, the most genuine of all political bodies we ever had, the antagonism of opposite creeds appeared even more distinctly. "It surpassed," said Azevedo Amaral, "all the preceding assemblies as a demonstration of lamentable incapacity in performing its legislative function."

During solid years of almost uninterrupted session, the Congress of 1934 did not pass a single complementary law scheduled in the constitution. The deputies, nevertheless, did not hesitate to approve matters of personal interest, many of which had to be vetoed by the executive. The budget was never voted within the legal term and in such conditions the executive could not balance the revenue with the appropriations.

Grave dangers to national life did not find in parliament the needed reaction, nor in the constitution the means to cope with them. In fact, Communism, on one side, and Fascism, on the other, threatened Brazil, practically at the same time, with new revolutionary agitation. In haste some drastic emergency measures had to be taken that altered substantially the constitutional law, in order to grant to the executive the indispensable powers to restore peace and security.

I do not know to what extent the extremist plans of 1935 endangered the regime, but it is a fact that the emergency powers voted by Congress marked the bankruptcy of our second republic, which, by the way, was very similar to the first.

The decisive reason for the *coup d'état* of November 10, 1937, and the constitution of the new state is given by the President himself in the following words: "The destitution and disorganization of our political life, as it has been going on up to the present, is now proved by the way the problem of presidential succession is being handled among us: a ridiculous competition of groups, acting by graft and demagogic pledges in presence of the most absolute lack of interest and indifference shown by the vital forces of the nation. Heads of state governments, bossing agitators, rascals, and opportunists, against popular will, have transformed themselves, from one day to another, into political leaders warranting presidential candidates for election, just as if the life of the country, in its collective meaning, were mere convention in order to legitimatize ambitions of provincial caudilhismo." In consequence, the elected president of 1934 sprang the *coup d'état*, which was carried out peaceably on November 10, 1937.

The legislative power in the Constitution of 1937 is exercised by the National Parliament with the collaboration of the Council of National Economy and the President of the Republic (Art. 38). The Parliament is formed of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Council, which has been substituted for the senate of previous constitutions.

The Chamber of Deputies is formed by representatives of the people elected by indirect suffrage. Direct election is restricted to municipal assemblies, and the municipal aldermen of these assemblies, as well as ten more citizens elected

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in the same direct way at the same time, constitute a sort of electoral college that elects the deputies to the Federal Chamber.

The Federal Council is formed by state representatives, chosen by the state legislatures—one from each state. Ten more members of the Federal Council are to be appointed by the president. The term of office for a councillor is six years and a deputy four years.

The other organ is the Council of National Economy, one of the innovations of the new law. It is to be composed of representatives from the different lines of business, selected for their special qualifications from professional associations and syndicates. They represent equally employers and employees. The Council has five sections: industry, agriculture, commerce, transportation, and credit. Here also is the president entitled to appoint three representatives in each section. The Council is authorized to contract specialists and experts and has a rather large field of action. Its power is expected to be still further increased by law, as a function of the corporative state, yet it is exercised by "means of opinions and recommendations concerning subjects within its consultative province" (Art. 38).

In principle, the initiative in law-making belongs to the government, yet from the Chamber or from the Federal Council initiative is legal if the bill is supported by one-third of the house.

As to the budget, every department prepares its appropriations, but the final expenditure is planned by a special administrative department that works as adviser to the president, controlling and supervising the whole public service. Before the signature of the president, the budget is passed through the Houses of Parliament, with short delays to discuss, approve, amend, or reject.

The President of the Republic coordinates the activity of the representative organs, controls the internal and external policy, promotes legislation and directs it, and superintends the administration of the country. He is in office for six years and is allowed to nominate one of the candidates to his succession. An electoral college of 125 voters (municipalities, Chamber, Federal Council, and National Council) is to choose the name of the next president; in case of disagreement with the president, the candidate is elected by universal suffrage: the people are to say which of two names must take office.

Decidedly, after the teachings of past experience and to avoid censure of political privileges, so common among us, many powers have been concentrated in the hands of the executive. "The intention of our forefathers thirty years ago," said Professor J. W. Jenks,¹ "was to give us a government of checks and balances, with executive, legislative, and judicial departments, distinct and separate; but, in order that our government may be efficient, the system of checks and balances which weaken it must be overcome by some coordinating force. In our country that force is our political parties." In Brazil, as we have tried for a whole century to create political parties and have been unsuccessful, the coordinating force has been entrusted to the president.

The Brazilian constitution is not yet in full execution, for we are still in the preparatory period of organization. Many new organs are already in function, chiefly the technical councils for public administration, for commerce, for immigration, for public education, as well as technical institutes for coffee, for sugar, for cocoa, and other national economic interests. The preparatory stage will end with a plebiscite

¹J. W. Jenks, *Principles of Politics from the Viewpoint of the American Citizen* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1909).

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for adoption or rejection of the constitution. But before election for the National Parliament, the National Economic Council must be organized.

Whether this constitution fits our purposes or not, it is early to say, but never has a Brazilian statute law been so elaborated in social and economic matters, never have political pitfalls of our past been so earnestly avoided; it claims to conform to Brazilian realities. The nomination of the president's successor by the president in office was, in the past, one of the Brazilian unconstitutional realities. Why not have it in the constitution and legalize it, leaving to the nation a decision if the National Assembly disagrees with the president?

The election to the senate, called today National Council, was a fraud, for the man "elected" was in fact chosen by the state assembly or the president of the state. Why not recognize him at once as the state representative and have that old practice transformed into a constitutional one?

The pressure of economic interests on legislative bodies was a curse in the past. Why not shift it to a professional body with only consultative power, as the Council of National Economy?

Those and many more peculiarities of Brazilian political practice have been studied, and instead of being vigorously opposed have been included in the constitution, making legal what was, in the past, a distortion. What is, after all, the law but a crystallization of habits and customs?

In fact it is, in the authoritative type of state, a really democratic move, for it introduces for the first time the vital popular forces into the structure of the state. Although it has nothing of Fascist or Nazi regime, it is an attempt to build a political entity along corporative lines. There is no more room left for professional politicians; the people are

directly or indirectly represented in all councils. Since 1930 not less than 2,500 syndicates have been officially recognized.

On the other hand, the regime of 1937 has checked the spirit of reformation that was threatening national unity. It has also stopped the spirit of internationalism that was growing under the form of European ideologies. There are isolated Fascist and Communist activities but, as A. A. Berle¹ says in the *Yale Review*:

The bulk of South America, like ourselves, appears to wish to be in the orbit neither of fascism nor of communism; to wish to preserve for its citizens, as well as it can, freedom to choose their own "good life." These countries have not yet evolved the economic method by which this can best be obtained, any more than we have; but they propose to evolve it as best they can, and are actively engaged in endeavoring to work out the mechanism. Government resting on a base other than the ballot box is no novelty in South America. Neither communism nor fascism was needed to create this phenomenon; and the continued existence in various countries of governments which claim sanction from something other than a majority vote of all individuals of full age is hardly a basis for classifying great parts of the continent as having taken sides in the struggle between international ideologies.

This may be applied equally to Brazil. It is almost guess-work to say what will be our situation a few years hence. Anyway, something had to be done; ready-made constitutions of foreign pattern had apparently not suited our needs. This one has features that might amaze the foreigner who still holds traditional prejudices in politics. Let him study, however, our problems, our situation, our democracy, and he will probably understand and say, "Well, that is a truly Brazilian constitution."

¹A. A. Berle, Jr., "After Lima," *Yale Review*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, March, 1939, pp. 454-5.

VI

BRAZIL AS A LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL UNIT

I. PHASES OF BRAZILIAN HISTORY

IT is almost a truism to say that interest in the history of a country is in proportion to the international importance of it as a nation. The dramatic circumstances that might have shaped that history are of no avail to make it worth knowing; the actual or past standing of the country and its people is thus the only practical motive. According to such an interpretation of historical interest, I may say that the international importance of Brazil seems to be growing fast.

Since the Great War, many books on South America have been published in the United States, and abundant references to Brazil may be found in all of them. Should I have to mention any of the recent books, I would certainly not forget Herman James's *Brazil after a Century*,¹ Jones's *South America*,² for the anthropogeographic point of view, Mary Williams's *People and Politics of Latin America*,³ the books of Roy Nash, J. F. Normano, J. F. Rippey, Max Winkler, and others.

Considering Brazil as a South American political entity, it is especially the historical point of view that I purpose to interpret. Therefore it may be convenient to have a preliminary general view of the story of independent Brazil,

¹See reference, Lecture V, p. 296.

²C. F. Jones, *South America* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930).

³Mary W. Williams, *The People and Politics of Latin America* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1930).

emphasizing the characteristic features of the different periods. Though usually precise dates are difficult to determine for the limitation of historical tendencies or trends, it happens that in Brazilian political evolution they seem to work satisfactorily enough.

1. The first ten years that followed independence, under Dom Pedro I, might be described as the period of political adjustment to constitutional life.

2. Then the first twenty years, 1831-1850, of the second emperor were the phase of internal strife in the provinces.

3. The next twenty years, 1850-1870, belong mostly to the history of external intervention in the River Plate affairs.

4. The last twenty years, 1870-1889, of the reign of Dom Pedro II, involved chiefly questions of social evolution—slave liberation and immigration—with a persistent republican propaganda.

5. With the republican institutions there is a quarter of a century, 1889-1914, of political adaptation and economic equipment of the country.

6. The war-crisis for ten years with presidentship discussed and criticized.

7. The last ten years, 1930-1940, could be labeled: industrialization and social legislation—with a strong current of nationalism.

During these 120 years of independent life, Brazil, as a political unit in our continent, has had her international interest of different kinds interpreted by a diplomatic agency of remarkable continuity of views, on the whole, and of great wisdom and moderation. I do not know whether tolerance and mildness are political qualities for a nation; anyway, they belong to the Brazilian people, and history proves that, whatever the regime of the country, they were traditionally connected with Brazilian foreign policy.

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Before stating the different problems that have called for the attention of republican diplomacy, it is necessary to say something about imperial and even colonial tradition.

II. TRADITIONS IN BRAZILIAN IMPERIAL DIPLOMACY

When the Brazilian nation became autonomous, there was no need to organize a new administrative system, to plan new international schemes, to train for a new political routine, for there had been no breaking up of the past, no swerving from established direction. On the contrary—and the fact seems unique among newly-formed nationalities—Brazil had already a well-organized foreign office with traditional views and ways. It was due to King John VI who, fleeing from Portugal in 1807 under the pressure of Napoleonic invasion, brought to Brazil, the new metropolis of his kingdom, papers, archives, officials, civil servants, and officers of one of the best-organized cabinets of Europe. Rio de Janeiro became thus the heir to Lisbon secrets from John I and his English wife, Philippa of Lancaster, Luis de Cunha, Alesandre de Gusmão, and the Marquis de Pombal. Four centuries of European political wisdom were piled in the royal trunks that landed in Brazil at that moment. And, as a Brazilian historian, Pedro Calmon, expresses it, King John rendered two great services to us: he endowed the country with a complete political apparatus of European make, and when he sailed away in 1821 he did not dismantle it. So we learned our lesson in European experience, and the Holy Alliance held no secrets for our rulers.

Although there was no discontinuity in Brazilian political activities on our continent, it does not imply that there was no evolution in the diplomatic system.

We inherited from the Portuguese system a certain attitude towards the Spanish American territories. Since 1679,

the Portuguese had repeatedly interfered in the River Plate. For the first time the Brazilian system had worked in 1750, and we had kept away from River Plate entanglements. But the European king, under cover of the Holy Alliance spirit, to uphold legitimacy and royalty against the revolution in Buenos Aires, interfered in Uruguay and finally annexed the Cisplatina Province. It was a personal triumph for King John, notwithstanding British diplomatic opposition. Soon after independence, the first emperor lost the heirloom of Cisplatina.

But against the Portuguese system of "imperial expansion," our policy turned little by little to the Brazilian system of "national consolidation," based on the principle of *uti possidetis*, expressed in the Treaty of Madrid, in 1750, by the Brazilian diplomacy of Alesandre de Gusmão.

The early relations of the United States with Brazil were not so friendly as they have become to-day. At the beginning of the nineteenth century privateering was unquestionably a profitable source of income to many American ship-owners. Baltimore's reputation as a rendezvous of privateers became so notorious that at the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the Portuguese government submitted a memorial on the subject, and the powers agreed to take up the question in a friendly fashion with the United States. Undoubtedly Brazil was back of the Portuguese protest, because it was Brazil that had suffered particularly through this practice. The Banda Oriental, now the Republic of Uruguay, had been seized by the Portuguese in 1816 from Artigas and his Argentinian forces. Artigas, however, could not afford to lose Montevideo; hence he engaged a number of privateers to prey upon Portuguese commerce. The Abbé Correa, the Portuguese minister to the United States, asserted that the greater part of these privateers were fitted out and manned in the ports of the United States. Adams conceded not only that this abomination had spread over a large portion of the merchants and population of Baltimore, but that it had infected almost every officer of the United States in the place. . . . Fortunately, by 1820 the power of Artigas was completely broken.¹

This was a blessing for peace and security as evidenced in

¹Graham H. Stuart, *Latin America and the United States* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), p. 420.

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the Treaty of 1828. In exchange we were able to compel River Plate governments to acknowledge the independence of Uruguay and our true southern boundaries.

Our reactionary attitude towards revolutionary explosions in Pernambuco in 1824 was duly appreciated by European monarchies of the Metternich system, but in America it was not approved in the same way. James Monroe is said to have expressed to the Argentinian Carlos Alvear his opinion that: the Brazilian government has close relations with European sovereigns but their relations with the new American nations are of mere courtesy, and undermined. On the other hand, Bolivar is supposed to have seriously planned a "destruction of the Empire" as stated in a letter from Dorrego to Lavalleja. As to our young emperor, while he had rather contradictory views on liberalism, his Americanism on the whole was of a constructive nature. The last scheme of Dom Pedro I was revealed, years later, to Manuel Moreno by the Foreign Office: Santo Amaro, his representative in London in 1830 had been instructed to discuss the possibility of enthroning European princes of royal blood in South American capitals. In 1831, however, he was compelled to abdicate himself. Curiously enough, his son, Pedro II, was not interested in the strange adventure of his cousin, Maximilian of Mexico, thirty years later.

The twenty years' period of the regency during Dom Pedro II's minority and the first years of his reign was one of internal strife and turbulence in the River Plate provinces.

Soon after the accession of the new emperor, local revolutions had broken out on political grounds in Minas, São Paulo, Recife, and Rio Grande do Sul. In this last province the "Farrapos" or "Tramps" war lasted ten years, 1835-1845. The gaucho rebels of the south never appealed for

foreign support, but the revolution itself was intimately connected with the River Plate crises, because of the attitude of Argentine and Uruguayan leaders toward the empire. The most interesting episode of that whole period of history in Buenos Aires was what has been called the "Age of Rosas," a twenty years' dictatorship of a so-called federalist caudillo, J. Manuel Rosas, whose "lack of a sound, wholesome sense of humour," says Mary Williams, "invited fanatical extremes."

For ten solid years, Dom Pedro II hesitated to interfere with River Plate caudillos. The year 1843 seems to be the turning-point in Brazilian diplomacy; it started the preparation of a new system in foreign policy, the intervention period that lasted from 1850 to 1870. The knotty point of the question was the siege of Montevideo by the commander-in-chief of Rosas' army, the "blanco" caudillo Oribe. The imperial government had no special sympathy towards the besieged "colorado" caudillo Rivera, who had friends among the "farrapos" rebels in Brazil. So the first move of imperial diplomacy was to accept an exchange of views with Tomas Guido, Rosas' representative in Rio de Janeiro. Mutual support was then considered, but the Brazilian cabinet insisted on a definite boundary convention with Uruguay and a positive acknowledgment of Uruguayan sovereignty. A preliminary treaty was negotiated, but for unknown reasons Rosas rejected it. At that moment it was all the worse for Brazil that England and France had recognized the blockade of Montevideo, and the hostility of Rosas was all the more significant. An inversion of attitudes was the result of the new Brazilian move in Uruguay and the "South American Troy" was victualled by our ships. In consequence, peace was restored in the Rio Grande by the pacification policy of the Duke of Caxias; a Brazilian emissary was sent to President Carlos López of Paraguay; the Marquis of Abrantes was

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sent to Europe to persuade Aberdeen and Guizot to help Rivera in Montevideo.

At that time our diplomatic relations with England were strained on account of difficulties that had arisen about the enforcement of the Aberdeen Bill on the slave trade. England was opposed to Brazilian intervention in the River Plate quarrel. At any rate, imperial diplomacy in 1850 succeeded in financing the resistance of Montevideo and came to an understanding with Urquiza, Rosas' caudillo in Entre Rios. A coalition was thus organized, with Argentinian, Uruguayan, and Brazilian elements, so that when the English cabinet started to discuss the case the London *Times* published the intervention news and, a few days later, Rosas was defeated at Monte Caseros and had to leave Buenos Aires on a British ship.

Thus were Argentina and Uruguay restored to normal representative government and Brazilian intervention appeared in its true light, pacifying, constructive, liberal, and American.

In Uruguayan political life the blanco party had always been anti-Brazilian and favored Argentina; the colorado party, on the other hand, was favorable to Brazil. Ten years later, in 1864, the complaints of Brazilian landowners in Uruguay, cattle breeders, and "rancheros" settled in northern departments, compelled the imperial government to send a special agent to Montevideo. This was the Saraiva Mission charged with demanding reparation for blanco aggression and attacks. In the meantime the new president of Paraguay, dictator Solano López, gave his underhand support to Uruguayan resistance, and the Saraiva Mission failed to obtain reparation. The empire was thus led to back the Uruguayan rebels of Venancio Flores and a new war started with the blockade of Salto and of Paysandú by the Brazilian fleet.

Montevideo surrendered at last and the colorados were restored to office.

This second war made unavoidable the third conflict: the Paraguayan War of five years, a long, cruel, and costly struggle. Over 100,000 Paraguayan soldiers lost their lives to uphold tyranny in South America. The Paraguayan dictator died in the last battle. The Brazilian monarch extended to the unhappy country his protection and generosity; there was neither retaliation, annexation, mortgage, nor irredentism. Brazil had found in Mitre, president of Argentina, and Flores, president of Uruguay, two helpful allies, who, acting in close cooperation, proved that the Brazilian attitude was the expression of continental political agreement.

The last phase of our imperial life was a period of twenty years of peace and prosperity. Dom Pedro II had promised that so long as he should live, no new war would ever drive him into conflict. The venerable old monarch upheld conciliation, accommodation, and arbitration as the best ways to settle international difficulties.

It was under his influence that our "imperial system" submitted to the President of the United States the boundary discussion we still had in 1889 with the Argentine Republic—the so-called Mission Territory question, that was settled later according to our claims.

III. PHASES OF REPUBLICAN DIPLOMACY

When republican government was established, in November, 1889, the recognition of the new order by foreign powers was by no means an easy task.

In America, I admit, the Spanish-speaking countries greeted the new regime with cordiality and sympathy. They were eager to see Brazil complete the list of American

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republics. The Argentine statesman Alberti had written in his *Essays*: "The existence of a monarchical power in Brazil does not suit American Republics." Another Argentine, Juan Carlos Gómez, had written to General Mitre: "I love the Brazilian people, but I hate the Brazilian Monarchy." Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay promptly recognized the new republic on November 20, 1889, five days after the proclamation; and in turn recognition was accorded by Chile on December 13; on January 3, 7, 13, and 29, respectively, by Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States; on February 6 by Guatemala and El Salvador, and on February 20 by Colombia, while in March Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras followed suit.

In Europe there was at the beginning a sort of lack of confidence in the provisional government that had overthrown the empire. There was also a significant expectant attitude of most monarchical governments in relation to what republican France would do. The negotiations in Paris were rather delayed and our agent, Baron de Itajubá, had some difficulties with Monsieur Ribot on account of a decree on naturalization issued by the Brazilian government on December 14, 1889, involving foreign residents in the country, and also on account of boundary disputes in Guiana. Only in June, 1890, was the French cabinet satisfied with our explanation and willing to recognize the new political form of government.

In Germany, Bismarck had a rather curious way of solving the question: his attitude in Berlin, not even receiving officially our envoy, differed totally from his attitude in Rio de Janeiro, where his envoy was instructed to carry on relations with the new Brazilian government.

In London, Salisbury admitted unofficially the Brazilian minister, but waited until the republican constitution had

been promulgated to invite him to the Queen's "drawing room."

On the other hand, Portugal, Italy, and Spain were unwilling to take definite action before hearing from France, whether, in the light of that country's experience with revolutions, ours was of a trustworthy type.

In Belgium recognition was unexpectedly involved in claims of Gaz Company shareholders.

Russia, bound by tradition, only recognized the Brazilian Republic in May, 1892, after the death of Emperor Pedro II.

At last, in the United States, discussions in Congress on Brazilian affairs proceeded as a sequence to the debates on President Harrison's message of December 2, 1889, in which immediate recognition was recommended.

Senator Morgan, Democrat, of Alabama, made a motion in support of the recommendation, referring in particular to the personality of the emperor, his visit to the United States, his liberalism, and rare qualities. He thought that any hesitation by the United States might have encouraged European monarchical interference in South America to restore the old regime, impair autonomy in our continent, and thus bring us under the operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Republican senators were not so eager to act and wanted more information on recent Brazilian political events. Finally the motion was sent to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and recognition followed in February, 1890.

Early in our republican life, and after two unimportant diplomatic incidents, one with Portugal and the other with Great Britain, there appeared on the Brazilian political stage the remarkable personality of J. M. da Silva Paranhos, known as the Baron of Rio Branco, or simply "the Baron."

He was the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, a statesman of the imperial regime. Born in 1845, he studied law in São

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Paulo and Recife, followed his father in a mission to the River Plate and Paraguay, and was elected deputy in 1869 by the Conservative Party. He soon entered journalism and stood for the freedom of the slaves.

His diplomatic career started in 1876 when appointed to Liverpool as consul-general. He spent long years in Europe, studying almost exclusively Brazilian affairs, history, politics, and geography, in European archives and libraries.

Therefore it was not by accident that the republican government chose Rio Branco, though not a republican himself, but evidently the best-equipped specialist to defend Brazilian interests in Washington, where our territorial dispute with Argentina, about the Mission Territory between the Uruguay River and the Iguassú River, had been submitted to the President of the United States for arbitration. In February, 1895, President Cleveland's decision acknowledged Brazilian rights: it was a victory of justice and of learning as well. The "Brazilian Memoir" of Rio Branco was a masterpiece.

It was only natural that after such a success another similar mission should be entrusted to the Baron. It was the territorial question of the Guiana, a controversy with France that went as far back as the Treaty of Utrecht. The question was submitted to the arbitration of the Swiss Federal Council. Another "Brazilian Memoir" of 840 pages was produced in Berne by Rio Branco and, in 1900, another diplomatic victory of the same kind was achieved by Brazil.

When Councillor Rodrigues Alves was elected president of the republic for the term 1902-1906, he invited the Baron to be his Foreign Secretary. Rio Branco came back to his country, reorganized the Chancery, centralizing in his office a well-informed "Intelligence Service" in close contact with all American diplomatic moves. And for ten years, until his

untimely death in 1912, he was the Brazilian Chancellor, the most popular man in the country, with moral authority and political prestige.

These ten years might be described as the Golden Era of Brazilian diplomacy.

The extensive frontier that both colonial and imperial regimes had bequeathed to the republic was in great part unsettled and uncertain. It was one of Rio Branco's chief purposes to have it settled by international agreements. One of Brazil's most prominent personalities, the historian and diplomatist Joaquim Nabuco, helped to solve another Brazilian frontier dispute by arbitration of the King of Italy, who in June, 1904, awarded most of the area in dispute to British Guiana. Later on Joaquim Nabuco was sent to Washington as our first Ambassador.

Out of 16,300 kilometers of continental frontiers, 14,000 kilometers were settled by Rio Branco, while in office; and the territory awarded to Brazil by his negotiations amounts to almost 450,000 square kilometers.

By far the greatest diplomatic stroke was the Brazilian achievement in the well-known Acre Territory, where a Brazilian community of settlers in the Upper Amazonian jungle had set up a sort of independent state in open conflict with Bolivian authorities and the newly incorporated Bolivian Syndicate. Rio Branco's intervention caused an expeditionary corps to be sent to prevent hostilities between Bolivian troops and the Acreans. Peace was successfully maintained, and a few months later the Treaty of Petropolis was signed between Brazil and Bolivia, November, 1903. We purchased the territory for two million pounds. A boundary adjustment was established, and we promised to build a 300-kilometer railway along the Madeira and Mamoré rivers to afford an outlet for India rubber exports of all

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the Brazilian-Bolivian Amazonian tributaries. Almost 150,000 square kilometers were thus peacefully annexed to Brazilian territory. Besides being good business it was an effective application of our traditional policy of *uti possidetis*. In three years, production of India rubber paid for the purchase.

Many more adjustments were negotiated by the Baron to settle our frontier questions with Venezuela, Colombia, and Dutch Guiana, and a boundary treaty was signed also with Peru for the western part of the Acre Territory, in 1909. In conformity with the spirit of the first republican constitution, no fewer than thirty arbitration treaties were ratified with all the nations.

Many other events of diplomatic significance were brought about by Rio Branco: the first cardinal for South America was appointed by Rome; the first South American Embassy in Washington was accepted; the Third Pan American Congress was summoned in Rio de Janeiro, in 1906, with a visit of Secretary Elihu Root; Brazil was represented by Ruy Barbosa at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.

All these facts show a growing international interest in Brazil as the result of intelligent and efficient political action of which Rio Branco was the promoter.

Of course such activity would arouse opposition in some quarters. Brazilian diplomacy was denounced as imperialistic by an Argentine statesman and journalist, Zeballos. In 1908 the famous Dispatch No. 9 was distorted by the press as meaning evil intentions of the Brazilian government in the River Plate. The Baron did not hesitate to publish the cipher, and the true tenor of the dispatch was revealed as the most peaceful and conciliatory instructions that a government could send.

Rio Branco's sentiments toward Argentina are expressed

in a private letter to the Argentine minister, Gorostiaga, in 1905: "I spent my youth," he wrote, "during the effective alliance of Brazil and Argentina. I am the son of a man who always was a sincere friend of the Argentine nation as he often proved in his political career. I wish that it might be said some day that during my term of office I did everything to dissipate misunderstandings and tighten relations of harmony between the two nations. Every day I am more convinced that a cordial understanding between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile would be of the greatest advantage to all three of them and would benefit others, beyond their frontiers."

Toward the United States Rio Branco's feelings might be gauged by the last lines of an article under the pseudonym, J. Penn, written by him when foreign secretary. "All the maneuvers against us tried in Washington, since 1823 up to now, have always failed against the unconquerable barrier of traditional friendliness that happily links Brazil to the United States, and it is the duty of the present generation to foster it with the same spirit and eagerness as our forefathers." These words are truly the most telling advice on foreign policy that has been bequeathed to Brazil by the Great Chancellor.

Not long after Rio Branco's death the world crisis dragged civilized nations into the Great War. Brazil kept neutral as long as possible, but not without a marked sympathy toward the Allies, chiefly under the influence of a prominent statesman, Ruy Barbosa, who could not remain an "indifferent spectator," as he said, in the world tragedy. After the unrestricted submarine warfare began in 1917, the country changed its attitude and severed diplomatic relations with Germany as the United States entered the conflict. In October of the same year the sinking of Brazilian ships determined the congress to join the Allies. Brazil sided with

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those whose position was, at the time, most critical and less promising. It was a severe drawback to her economic life, but it had, at least, one happy result: it drew our attention to the necessity of intensifying our relations with the United States and, consequently, to the leading of a decidedly American life. We realized at last in a practical way what Elihu Root had said in 1907: our national resources are complementary and so are our respective populations, their activities, and their mentalities. These facts had considerable bearing henceforth on our foreign policy.

After peace was restored Brazil joined the League of Nations and was able to secure one of the four non-permanent seats in the Council. She played her part in the pacific settlement of disputes, namely, in the Aaland Islands case between Sweden and Finland in 1921. For six years Brazil held her seat in a state of semi-permanence, but in 1926 when the entry of Germany was decided upon, and the Concert of Great Powers seemed willing to drop old friends for new, the Brazilian government thought it advisable to give notice of their resignation. The withdrawal of Brazil from the League did not involve her indifference to the non-political activities of the World Court and the Labor Bureau. The League of Nations episode, in the diplomatic life of the country, emphasized to us the fact that Pan Americanism is, for the time being, the only practical form of internationalism.

"It is necessary to recognize that the Council, as constituted," says Gathorne-Hardy, "was definitely a compromise between the democratic theory of the League and the practical survival of a Concert of Great Powers, without whose approval the new order could not be expected to work. . . . a class distinction in the international hierarchy was implicit in the arrangement."¹

¹G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-34* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 190.

The failure of the League of Nations in America became apparent in 1933 when four non-American representatives, Spain, Great Britain, France, and Italy, besides Mexico, were appointed to adjust the Chaco quarrel in South America. Both belligerents, Paraguayans and Bolivians alike, announced that they preferred Americans. A mediatory group consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay succeeded in a few months in bringing about negotiations for peace—a protocol was signed in June, 1935. Once more Brazilian diplomacy was called to join in with her sister republics.

IV. BRAZIL AND PAN AMERICANISM

It appears that the Monroe Doctrine has two meanings: a general one on which everybody seems to agree, because everybody sees in it the same thing, let us say, an almost exclusive interest in American territories and activities; and an individual view, that has not yet commanded unanimous approval, in which every single person or group of persons finds a different thing, according to an optimistic or a pessimistic view of human affairs. Thus in addition to a permanent element, the Monroe Doctrine has expedient and pragmatic elements that vary according to opportunities.

The first point of view, the only one that interests us, as a lasting interpretation, shows a closer connection with what we call Pan Americanism. "We are Americans and nothing could ever find us indifferent."

The Monroe Doctrine is an international principle, maybe, but it is far more an attitude of the American mind. It is my purpose to examine, as far as Brazil is concerned, what our reactions have been in connection with it.

First of all: Brazil had a Monroe Doctrine before President Monroe had delivered his well-known message of 1823. We

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were still a Portuguese colony, a kingdom, when our regent, Prince Pedro of Bragança, sent to the United States of America and to Buenos Aires consular representatives that were, in fact, secret agents of his political plans for independence. To Correa da Camara, our agent in Buenos Aires, José Bonifacio gave confidential instructions which run as follows:¹ "You shall show that a recolonization of Brazil is an impossibility." This was written on May 30, 1822, ninety days before our independence was declared.² These confidential instructions say further:

Yet, if it were believable that Brazil would fall to pieces owing to internal divisions, the example would prove fatal to America and her other States would repent in vain not having helped us; but, as soon as Unity and Independence are consolidated, Europe shall at once lose all hope of restoring her domination in her former colonies. After having skillfully persuaded (the Buenos Aires government) that the interests of this Kingdom are the same as those of the other States of this Hemisphere, and demonstrated the destinies they share with us, your Lordship shall promise on behalf of his Royal Highness the solemn acknowledgement of their political independence, and shall explain the invaluable benefits that would result from a Confederation or an offensive and defensive Treaty with Brazil, in order to oppose, with all Spanish American Governments, the astute plots of European policy.

Brazil was ripe for hearing and understanding President Monroe's advice. A few days later, on June 10, more instructions were sent to our secret agent by our Foreign Office: "I may inform your Lordship that His Royal Highness does not wish to adopt a system that would not prove to be American, for He is convinced that the interests of all American Governments, whatever they are, must all be considered as homogeneous, resulting from the same principle: a just and firm repulse of the arrogant claims of Europe."

¹Annals of Itamaraty, Vol. II, p. 234.

²President Monroe recognized our Independence in 1824. "At the cabinet meeting when the question was brought up, Mr. Wirt opposed recognition on the ground that the government was monarchical and not republican; but both Calhoun and Adams favored recognition on the basis of independence alone, leaving aside all consideration of internal government"—Graham H. Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

Early in 1824, José Sylvestre Rebello was appointed first diplomatic representative to the United States. About two months after Monroe's message enunciating the Monroe Doctrine, the imperial government had sent Rebello the following instructions: "The principles expressed in the President's message of December to both Houses have a more general application to all the States of this Continent, as the message announces clearly the necessity of uniting ourselves to struggle for the defense of our rights and territories. Your Lordship shall feel the dispositions of the United States Government towards an offensive and defensive alliance with this Empire, as a part of the American Continent; provided such an alliance have no reciprocal concessions as a base, but only the principle of mutual convenience thereof resulting." Rebello suggested a concert of American powers to sustain the general system of American independence and proposed a definite alliance.

"Monroe," says Graham Stuart, "declined the proposal in private to Adams; but no official reply was made until Adams became President, when Clay declared that the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil seemed to make such an alliance unnecessary."¹

In 1825, an incident brought about strained relations between Brazil and the United States. Condé Raguet, the American chargé, protested against the Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires, and a crisis was reached when the American vessel, the *Spark*, was seized in 1827 by a Brazilian warship, as suspected of being a privateer. Unsatisfied with the Brazilian explanations, Raguet "the next day asked for his passports and the Emperor, although 'surprised at this precipitate request couched in abrupt and vague language' ordered them to be delivered, but with the notice that the

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 421.

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American representative would be answerable to his government for the consequences which might result. Before the break in diplomatic relations came, both Clay and Adams became convinced that Mr. Raguét's language and conduct were not so reserved as they should have been, and in a note dated January 20, 1827, Clay wrote Raguét that the President would have been better satisfied if he had abstained from some of the language employed."¹

The interruption of diplomatic relations in Rio did not extend to Washington, for Clay, being assured by Rebello that reparations would be forthcoming, named as chargé at Rio, William Tudor, a merchant at Lima. The appointment proved excellent. Tudor was a man of tact and good judgment. He placed the relations between the two nations upon a firm basis of friendly understanding. He concluded a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, incorporating the most-favored nation clause and settlement of the blockade question.

It would take too long to quote all the episodes of a century of friendly relations, in which the words "American interests," "friendship," "understanding," and even "alliance" have frequently been repeated as expressing attitudes and purposes held in common. It would be sufficient to quote the words of some of our most prominent statesmen like Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and others.

In 1910, at the Fourth Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires, the Brazilian minister at Buenos Aires, Dr. Domicio da Gama, explained to members of the Chilean delegation the wish of the late Ambassador Nabuco to present to the Conference a motion which "would evidence the recognition by all the countries of America of the fact

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 423; Stuart gives as his authority House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 104-108.

that the Monroe Doctrine had been beneficial to them." It was a formal declaration the Government of Brazil desired to present without any change, out of respect to the memory of the Ambassador, "recognizing it as a permanent factor making for international peace upon the American Continent." Alexandre Alvarez proposed a rather different resolution, "a factor contributing towards guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Nations of this Continent." It was submitted to the members of the Argentine delegation. Some delegates thought that the approval of the motion would be sanction of "many acts of hegemony committed by the United States by which more than one country had felt its sovereign dignity to have been wounded." Therefore the delegation of the United States, though admitting the right of Latin America to make the Monroe Doctrine hers, feared the discussion would create dissensions in the assembly, and thought it preferable to make no presentation at all. Brazil realized that unanimous assent was difficult to obtain. Anyway the incident helped to make clear: (1) that the Monroe Doctrine was in accord with the New World diplomatic aims and was part of its public law; (2) that the Chilean government was willing to join in the resolution; (3) that the wording was difficult to find without exciting European susceptibilities, and some states wanted restrictions as to the United States hegemony; (4) that Brazil had not received a diplomatic rebuff; (5) that the Monroe Doctrine was not disavowed by the Conference, since the question was not one of public law proclaimed, but of simply a historical fact recognized as having dominated the political life of the New World.

In 1923 the Centennial of the Monroe Doctrine was celebrated on December 2 in our Foreign Office, and Chancellor Felix Pacheco in his speech mentioned the diverse interpre-

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tations of that Doctrine, but added: "It is not my business to say anything about these interpretations. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country, my duty is to affirm, once more, our gratitude to, and besides that gratitude, our close solidarity with the United States of America in supporting that line of action in which the idea of mutual help and assistance the American nations owe to one another is a capital element."

Chancellor Pacheco's conviction was that the Doctrine had worked long enough to prove that it was a permanent factor of peace on the American continent.

The Chilean internationalist, Alexandre Alvarez, has abundantly proved that the political and economic history of the New World has provided all the elements for an American international law.

As European international law, resulting from Christian civilization and occidental culture, seemed to be universal, it would be difficult for Europeans to admit the existence of an Asiatic or of an African international law, yet there are such laws and their existence in no way destroys the universal community of nations.

The American international law ignores such questions as "influence zone," "protectorate," "neutral states," "personal union," etc. On the other hand, "federation," "nationality," "international rivers and canals" have different meanings in America, and many more problems of international cooperation and support have among us a broader field. Our fifty years' experience of Pan American Conferences has emphasized many new aspects of inter-American relations, many more than Secretary Blaine ever dreamed of when he invited us to Washington in 1889.

A long way has been travelled since: the third Conference was summoned in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, and the last one,

the eighth, was summoned in Lima in 1938. Brazil has faithfully attended all these meetings, besides many others, and has sent her representatives to Europe, to the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, and to the Versailles Peace Settlement, after the first Great War, but always the same principles have guided her attitude, and those principles were typically Pan American.

To European diplomatists it was almost scandalous for the Brazilian delegate, Ruy Barbosa, to talk in 1907 of compulsory arbitration, to propose equality of all nations in the Permanent Court of Justice, and to suggest the non-recognition of acquisitions by war or by threat—an interpretation that later on was to be known as the "Stimson Doctrine," in 1932. As one of our prominent internationalists, Dr. Raúl Fernandes, defined us in 1928, "Brazil, from an international point of view, is synonymous with Arbitration."

These were truly American ideals that could only have grown in Pan American hot-beds, and it might be inferred that in extra-American meetings Brazil has always represented the tradition of America.

Lately our President, Dr. Getulio Vargas, said, "Extending to the field of economic cooperation our relations of good neighborliness with a marked character of continental solidarity, our Country shows how ideals of American fraternalization may be attained."

V. THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

Brazil has always maintained friendly feelings towards her sister republics of the continent. A traditional friendship has long existed between Brazil and Chile; with the Argentine also there are cordial memories of alliances in the past, for example, against Rosas and in the Paraguayan War; nor did Rio Branco's victory in the Mission Territory arbitration

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blur any of them substantially. In 1899, General Julio Roca visited Brazil, and the next year President Campos Salles returned the visit. An Argentine president, Roque Saenz Pena, had already declared to Brazil: "Everything unites us, nothing divides us."

When, in the beginning of 1914, the Tampico incident and the Vera Cruz landing nearly resulted in a Mexican War, the so-called A.B.C. powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, did not hesitate to instruct their ambassadors in Washington to meet President Wilson in conference and offer their friendly intervention. It was accepted and the Niagara Falls meeting smoothed the whole situation.

After the World War had started, the A.B.C. powers thought that perhaps their cooperation in America would prove useful. A treaty was signed in Buenos Aires on May 25, 1915, the Argentine Independence Day, to "make easy the pacific solution of international controversies." The A.B.C. initiative, however, was not always well interpreted: Peru and Bolivia, still sore over the Tacna and Arica question with Chile, tried a "Bolivarian league" to oppose the possible hegemony which the A.B.C. might try to establish in South America.

The A.B.C. Treaty, however, was never ratified by Argentina, yet in 1932 the A.B.C. made a worthy attempt to settle the Leticia controversy between Peru and Colombia. In short, the A.B.C. entente never worked as such, not because of any idea of domination, but because the remainder of the alphabet was missing, and the true Pan American spirit requires both totality and equality among American nations.

The A.B.C. group has proved itself useful in international relations, and might still be of some help in the future, but merely as an occasional American group that agrees on some special question, and not as an international entity with a

permanent committee, as was planned in 1915. Brazil and the Argentine are the best friends in the world, they are economically complementary, and are not competitors, but their leanings are diverse: Argentina is far more European in her sympathies, interests, and politics.

It would not be fair to say that Brazil has kept away from powerful European influences. Our civilization was born of European cultural complexes, and we do not intend to sever our ties with Europe.

But these ties are of different kinds. With practically all nations of the Old World we have important commercial relations: they are the basis of diplomatic connections with the European powers. Since the early years of our independence, commercial and navigation treaties have been signed with the different countries; they were denounced in the twentieth century and new understandings were drawn. For the time being, we have provisional commercial agreements, passed in 1936, with most European countries.

Another line of special interests concerns the nations that send us an annual flow of immigrants. We are therefore in more intimate diplomatic contact with Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Germany, as well as Japan, in Asia.

The pre-eminence of England in our foreign relations during more than a century was due in part to the financial dependence of Brazil. With Germany there has been scientific contact; from Italy a great deal of Latin culture has come through artistic channels. Portugal, in former times, revealed Asia, and chiefly India, to the Brazilians.

But the greatest cultural influence, through literature, art, political life, fashions, and social customs has been that of France. And of course such a powerful contact, though slightly in decline, owing to competition of other cultures, is bound to create political sympathies that even opposite economic interests are not able to abate or even to check.

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A Brazilian diplomatist, Helio Lobo, has recently written about our position in America: "With the United States, we were in America a variant of language and customs, besides other factors that segregated us also." Was that the origin of our friendship? Did that friendship always exist? The fact deserves investigation, as the interest of the American reader in Brazil seems to have increased lately, for several books refer to the diplomatic relations of the two countries.

It is possible that when official correspondence, reports, and private archives of the two nations have been searched and studied, different phases of these relations will appear under a new light.

The first phase began when we became independent of Portugal and tried to interest the government in Washington in our affairs, for example, through the missions of G.da Cruz and Sylvestre Rebello. It was a period of mutual sympathy without cooperation.

The second phase, although it involves the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1828, was marked by the missions to Rio de Janeiro of Raguet, of Henry Wise, and General Watson Webb. Incidents were multiplied; perhaps some blunders were made: we recognized Maximilian, we insisted on being neutrals in the Civil War, we saw our attitude in the River Plate ill interpreted. I would call that the period of mutual distrust, which lasted until Watson Webb was recalled in 1869.

The third period is a period of calm and soothing effect. The Brazilian republican evolution makes us more alike; we are no more suspected—recovered sympathy is joined by interest in the Commercial Agreement of 1891—sympathy and interest might be its title.

The fourth period starts in 1902, when the Great Chancellor came into office. It is the phase of Rio Branco, Elihu

Root, Joaquim Nabuco, in Pan American Congresses. There is more than interest: it is the period of good will and co-operation.

The fifth phase starts with the joining in the Great War and the after-war developments. It spells even more than cooperation; it is mutual understanding and help. That is still the situation we are trying to improve, if possible.

"The fact," says Normano, "that Brazil's attitude toward the United States is more friendly than that of any Spanish American country, has been noted by many writers of the United States," and he quotes Bingham, Clarence Haring, Percy Martin, and others. If the spirit of a truly political alliance is already in the air, what shall the next phase be called, I wonder?

CARLOS DELGADO DE CARVALHO.



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